Quentin,
you are, it seems to me, simply reproducing the MGA. You are assuming a
(material) computer on which the AI+environment run - relatively to us,
this will never be conscious - but it _could_ be conscious relatively to
other computations in Platonia.
To make an AI conscious relatively to us, you have to keep it's
counterfactual structure and intricate causal dynamics relating it to
the _our_ environment intact - otherwise it will not be conscious (for us).
This is not strange - a human who loses parts of his thalamocortical
structure (assuming he has an accident and is being kept alive by
medical machines) will also cease to be conscious - see for instance
Tononi, 2004. (
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2202/5/42) (open
access, good paper). At least, he will cease to be conscious relatively
to those worlds where he has the accident.
I guess it boils down to the fact that you can't take parts of the
metaphysics and ignore the implications.
Assuming that computation suffices for AI _automatically_ leads to a
view which makes computational states conscious relative to some worlds
but not to others.
That is relative state with a vengeance.
Cheers,
Günther
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> Maybe I wasn't clear enough in my explanations, so I'll try to be clearer.
>
> Let's suppose we have a "conscious" program (an AI), running in a
> simulated environment.
> Let us record the run of the environment+AI.
>
> Then restore the state of the program just at the start of the record.
>
> I can now selectively replace any subpart of the AI or Environment or
> both with a stub subpart which instead of doing an actual computation
> and return the computed result to other subparts simply make a lookup in
> the recorded state we've done before. In the end I can replace
> everything with just a lookup (the case where all gates are broken and
> receive lucky rays in the movie graph), the stub subpart plays the role
> of the lucky rays.
>
> So if by our assumption our program was "conscious", If I replace only
> one subpart is it still ?... 2 ? 3 ? ... everything ?
>
> Quentin
>
> 2009/1/28 Quentin Anciaux <allcolor.domain.name.hidden <mailto:allcolor.domain.name.hidden.com>>
>
>
>
> 2009/1/28 Bruno Marchal <marchal.domain.name.hidden <mailto:marchal.domain.name.hidden.ac.be>>
>
>
>
> Hi Quentin,
>
> > I was thinking about the movie graph and its conclusions. It
> > concludes that it is absurd for the connsciousness to
> supervene on
> > the movie hence physical supervenience is false.
>
>
> OK. It is a reductio ad absurdo. It assumes that consciousness
> supervenes on the physical activity of a brain (Phys. Sup.), it
> shows
> that it leads to the fact that consciousness suoervenes on a movie
> "qua computatio", and this is considered as an absurdity, and so it
> concludes that Phys. Sup is false.
>
>
> >
> >
> > But if I simulate the graph with a program, and having for
> exemple
> > each gates represented by a function like "out = f(in)" each
> > functions of the simulated graph is in a library which is loaded
> > dynamically. I can record a run and then on new run I can
> > selectively replace each libraries/functions by another one
> with the
> > same function contract but which instead of computing the out
> value,
> > it takes the value from the record. I can do it like in the movie
> > graph for each gates/functions.
> >
> > Then it seems that means in the end the consciousness has to
> > supervene on the record...
>
> Why? Consciousness supervenes on the computation(s), not on his
> physical implementation, be it with record or with the original
> modules.
>
>
> > then it is the same conclusion than for physical
> supervenience. What
> > is wrong ?
>
> The physical supervenience. Consciousness does not supervene on any
> implementation "in particular" of a computation. It supervenes
> on all
> (immaterial) computations going through the (relevant) states.
> This is
> in Platonia.
>
> Tell me if I miss something, but it seems to me there is no problem
> here. It is just, again, a problem if you believe in some physical
> supervenience.
>
> Best,
>
> Bruno
>
>
> The problem I see is that the movie graph is used to show that
> phys-sup is wrong (having as condition that I know consciousness is
> turing-emulable, as we have a "conscious" graph which is the
> physical implementation), the argument shows that consciousness does
> not supervene on this physical implementation because we should be
> forced to accept it also supervene upon broken graph + movie. But
> what I think with my exemple is that it does not supervene on the
> particular simulation of the functionnal graph nor does it supervene
> on the non-functionnal lookup record sumulation of the graph.
>
> I understand the thing is that it supervene on all computations not
> a particular computation... but I don't see how then movie graph
> rules out phys sup and not any kind of supervenience.
>
> Regards,
> Quentin
>
>
>
>
>
> >
> >
> > Regards,
> > Quentin
> >
> > --
> > All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain.
> >
> > >
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
> <http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> --
> All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain.
>
>
>
>
> --
> All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain.
>
>
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Received on Thu Jan 29 2009 - 09:20:11 PST