Maybe I wasn't clear enough in my explanations, so I'll try to be clearer.
Let's suppose we have a "conscious" program (an AI), running in a simulated
environment.
Let us record the run of the environment+AI.
Then restore the state of the program just at the start of the record.
I can now selectively replace any subpart of the AI or Environment or both
with a stub subpart which instead of doing an actual computation and return
the computed result to other subparts simply make a lookup in the recorded
state we've done before. In the end I can replace everything with just a
lookup (the case where all gates are broken and receive lucky rays in the
movie graph), the stub subpart plays the role of the lucky rays.
So if by our assumption our program was "conscious", If I replace only one
subpart is it still ?... 2 ? 3 ? ... everything ?
Quentin
2009/1/28 Quentin Anciaux <allcolor.domain.name.hidden>
>
>
> 2009/1/28 Bruno Marchal <marchal.domain.name.hidden>
>
>
>>
>> Hi Quentin,
>>
>> > I was thinking about the movie graph and its conclusions. It
>> > concludes that it is absurd for the connsciousness to supervene on
>> > the movie hence physical supervenience is false.
>>
>>
>> OK. It is a reductio ad absurdo. It assumes that consciousness
>> supervenes on the physical activity of a brain (Phys. Sup.), it shows
>> that it leads to the fact that consciousness suoervenes on a movie
>> "qua computatio", and this is considered as an absurdity, and so it
>> concludes that Phys. Sup is false.
>>
>>
>> >
>> >
>> > But if I simulate the graph with a program, and having for exemple
>> > each gates represented by a function like "out = f(in)" each
>> > functions of the simulated graph is in a library which is loaded
>> > dynamically. I can record a run and then on new run I can
>> > selectively replace each libraries/functions by another one with the
>> > same function contract but which instead of computing the out value,
>> > it takes the value from the record. I can do it like in the movie
>> > graph for each gates/functions.
>> >
>> > Then it seems that means in the end the consciousness has to
>> > supervene on the record...
>>
>> Why? Consciousness supervenes on the computation(s), not on his
>> physical implementation, be it with record or with the original modules.
>>
>>
>> > then it is the same conclusion than for physical supervenience. What
>> > is wrong ?
>>
>> The physical supervenience. Consciousness does not supervene on any
>> implementation "in particular" of a computation. It supervenes on all
>> (immaterial) computations going through the (relevant) states. This is
>> in Platonia.
>>
>> Tell me if I miss something, but it seems to me there is no problem
>> here. It is just, again, a problem if you believe in some physical
>> supervenience.
>>
>> Best,
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>
> The problem I see is that the movie graph is used to show that phys-sup is
> wrong (having as condition that I know consciousness is turing-emulable, as
> we have a "conscious" graph which is the physical implementation), the
> argument shows that consciousness does not supervene on this physical
> implementation because we should be forced to accept it also supervene upon
> broken graph + movie. But what I think with my exemple is that it does not
> supervene on the particular simulation of the functionnal graph nor does it
> supervene on the non-functionnal lookup record sumulation of the graph.
>
> I understand the thing is that it supervene on all computations not a
> particular computation... but I don't see how then movie graph rules out
> phys sup and not any kind of supervenience.
>
> Regards,
> Quentin
>
>
>>
>>
>>
>> >
>> >
>> > Regards,
>> > Quentin
>> >
>> > --
>> > All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain.
>> >
>> > >
>>
>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ <http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> >>
>>
>
>
> --
> All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain.
>
--
All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain.
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Received on Thu Jan 29 2009 - 04:18:39 PST