Re: Movie graph and computational supervenience

From: Bruno Marchal <marchal.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Wed, 28 Jan 2009 21:10:49 +0100

Hi Quentin,

> I was thinking about the movie graph and its conclusions. It
> concludes that it is absurd for the connsciousness to supervene on
> the movie hence physical supervenience is false.


OK. It is a reductio ad absurdo. It assumes that consciousness
supervenes on the physical activity of a brain (Phys. Sup.), it shows
that it leads to the fact that consciousness suoervenes on a movie
"qua computatio", and this is considered as an absurdity, and so it
concludes that Phys. Sup is false.


>
>
> But if I simulate the graph with a program, and having for exemple
> each gates represented by a function like "out = f(in)" each
> functions of the simulated graph is in a library which is loaded
> dynamically. I can record a run and then on new run I can
> selectively replace each libraries/functions by another one with the
> same function contract but which instead of computing the out value,
> it takes the value from the record. I can do it like in the movie
> graph for each gates/functions.
>
> Then it seems that means in the end the consciousness has to
> supervene on the record...

Why? Consciousness supervenes on the computation(s), not on his
physical implementation, be it with record or with the original modules.


> then it is the same conclusion than for physical supervenience. What
> is wrong ?

The physical supervenience. Consciousness does not supervene on any
implementation "in particular" of a computation. It supervenes on all
(immaterial) computations going through the (relevant) states. This is
in Platonia.

Tell me if I miss something, but it seems to me there is no problem
here. It is just, again, a problem if you believe in some physical
supervenience.

Best,

Bruno



>
>
> Regards,
> Quentin
>
> --
> All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain.
>
> >

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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Received on Wed Jan 28 2009 - 15:10:54 PST

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