2009/1/18 Brent Meeker <meekerdb.domain.name.hidden>
>
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >
> > On 15 Jan 2009, at 22:50, Brent Meeker wrote:
> >
> >>
> >> Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >>>
> >>> On 14 Jan 2009, at 18:40, Brent Meeker wrote:
> >>>
> >>>> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> >>>>> 2009/1/14 Brent Meeker <meekerdb.domain.name.hidden
> >>>>> <mailto:meekerdb.domain.name.hidden>> wrote:
> >>>>> <snip>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> in a computer program. But a computer program requires a computer
> >>>> to run
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> This is true, but the word "run" is ambiguous. It could be a
> >>> mathematical run.
> >>
> >> But isn't that the crux of the question? Mathematics is a set of
> logical
> >> relations - which have no temporal component. So a "mathematical run"
> >> can only
> >> be analogous to a physical run. So what is it in a mathematical run
> >> that makes
> >> it a "run" instead of just a timeless Platonic object?
> >
> >
> > The notion of step, and successor of a step. For a mathematical run you
> > have a notion of first step, second step, etc.
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >>
> >>
> >>> It is digital some we can use the natural numbers
> >>> and the successor relation for the first order time of the UD run.
> >>
> >> But if we look at the program for a UD the successor relation is not
> >> implemented. When it is run on a computer, the physics of the
> >> computer provides
> >> the succession.
> >
> >
> > That is based on your theory according to which there is a physical
> > reality. I have no problem with that, but the UDA has shown that you
> > have to say no to the doctor,
>
> Why? The doctor proposes a physical implementation.
Yes and I thought I did show you that which physical implementation is used
doesn't matter ? or would you say you would accept a digital copy of
yourself on ARM but not on Core 2 DUO ?
>
>
> >or to point on the point that you don't
> > understand in the UDA.
> > You told us you have a problem with the UDA 6, I have provided an
> > explanation, but then I am not sure if this satisfies you or not.
> > Rfefrerring to the environment does not change the reasoning, unless you
> > put non-turing emulable feature in your brain/ environment (but then you
> > say no to the doctor).
> >
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>>
> >>>> In terms of Bruno's teleporter, one might say yes accepting that
> >>>> there would be
> >>>> a one-time gap in consciousness (ever had a concussion?), but one
> >>>> would probably
> >>>> hesitate if the there was to be a gap every 10ms.
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> From the ultimate third point of view, there are no gap, or there are
> >>> gaps everywhere, that could depend on the topology or topologies you
> >>> will extract from the numbers.
> >>
> >> In order to teleport me, my state must be determined. That means the
> >> values of
> >> physical variables at disparate spacetime points (in my head or my
> galaxy
> >> or...), but relativity makes it impossible to determine the state over
> an
> >> extended region until some later time on the order of d/c where d is
> >> the size of
> >> the region. So in reproducing me in the teleporter this increment of
> >> time will
> >> not be reproduced - I will experience a gap in consciousness, or a
> >> failure to
> >> remember a certain interval just before the teleportation. It's
> >> comparable to
> >> the time it would take a computer to store an image of it's state.
> >
> >
> > Are you stopping at UDA step 1?
>
> No. There's a difference between your idea of running a world and making a
> copy
> of me within this world. I think the latter will necessarily incur a gap
> in my
> consciousness because of the need to gather the information about my state
> (plus
> some environment), but not the former.
>
Ok let's accept that for your first copy (biological brain copied into
digital form) you did occur a conscionsness gap because of that... but then
I have a digital copy of you, and if you still believe it is you, I can put
your digital copy running on my bananas computer, agreed ? and no more gap
occurs copying you because I'm external to your simulated brain/environnment
running in my bananas computer.
>
> > With some effort Stathis, Quentin or me, or some other will succeed in
> > making you say directly "no" to the doctor.
>
> Do I have to say "no" just because I suppose I'd incur a gap in
> consciousness? :-)
>
No, just because you don't believe that the digital version is still you.
Regards,
Quentin
>
> Brent
>
> >In that case you just say no
> > to UDA step 0, that is to comp. I have no problem with that.
> >
> > I am personally not interested in discussing if comp is true or false
> > (except for debunking invalid reasoning which are ffrequent there).
> > My point is just that IF comp is true, THEN physics is a branch of
> > number theory, and I propose a constructive prove which shows how to
> > drive physics from numbers making the comp hyp. empirically refutable,
> > making comp a scientific theory, in the Popper sense of "scientific".
> >
> > I have no doubt that digital mechanism and materialism are incompatible,
> > though.
>
> Is that because, under materialism, consciousness depends on causal links?
>
> Brent
>
> >
> > Bruno
> > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ <http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/>
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > >
>
>
> >
>
--
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Received on Sun Jan 18 2009 - 05:19:42 PST