Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 15 Jan 2009, at 22:50, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>> On 14 Jan 2009, at 18:40, Brent Meeker wrote:
>>>
>>>> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>>>> 2009/1/14 Brent Meeker <meekerdb.domain.name.hidden
>>>>> <mailto:meekerdb.domain.name.hidden>> wrote:
>>>>> <snip>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> in a computer program. But a computer program requires a computer
>>>> to run
>>>
>>>
>>> This is true, but the word "run" is ambiguous. It could be a
>>> mathematical run.
>>
>> But isn't that the crux of the question? Mathematics is a set of logical
>> relations - which have no temporal component. So a "mathematical run"
>> can only
>> be analogous to a physical run. So what is it in a mathematical run
>> that makes
>> it a "run" instead of just a timeless Platonic object?
>
>
> The notion of step, and successor of a step. For a mathematical run you
> have a notion of first step, second step, etc.
>
>
>
>
>
>>
>>
>>> It is digital some we can use the natural numbers
>>> and the successor relation for the first order time of the UD run.
>>
>> But if we look at the program for a UD the successor relation is not
>> implemented. When it is run on a computer, the physics of the
>> computer provides
>> the succession.
>
>
> That is based on your theory according to which there is a physical
> reality. I have no problem with that, but the UDA has shown that you
> have to say no to the doctor,
Why? The doctor proposes a physical implementation.
>or to point on the point that you don't
> understand in the UDA.
> You told us you have a problem with the UDA 6, I have provided an
> explanation, but then I am not sure if this satisfies you or not.
> Rfefrerring to the environment does not change the reasoning, unless you
> put non-turing emulable feature in your brain/ environment (but then you
> say no to the doctor).
>
>>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>> In terms of Bruno's teleporter, one might say yes accepting that
>>>> there would be
>>>> a one-time gap in consciousness (ever had a concussion?), but one
>>>> would probably
>>>> hesitate if the there was to be a gap every 10ms.
>>>
>>>
>>> From the ultimate third point of view, there are no gap, or there are
>>> gaps everywhere, that could depend on the topology or topologies you
>>> will extract from the numbers.
>>
>> In order to teleport me, my state must be determined. That means the
>> values of
>> physical variables at disparate spacetime points (in my head or my galaxy
>> or...), but relativity makes it impossible to determine the state over an
>> extended region until some later time on the order of d/c where d is
>> the size of
>> the region. So in reproducing me in the teleporter this increment of
>> time will
>> not be reproduced - I will experience a gap in consciousness, or a
>> failure to
>> remember a certain interval just before the teleportation. It's
>> comparable to
>> the time it would take a computer to store an image of it's state.
>
>
> Are you stopping at UDA step 1?
No. There's a difference between your idea of running a world and making a copy
of me within this world. I think the latter will necessarily incur a gap in my
consciousness because of the need to gather the information about my state (plus
some environment), but not the former.
> With some effort Stathis, Quentin or me, or some other will succeed in
> making you say directly "no" to the doctor.
Do I have to say "no" just because I suppose I'd incur a gap in consciousness? :-)
Brent
>In that case you just say no
> to UDA step 0, that is to comp. I have no problem with that.
>
> I am personally not interested in discussing if comp is true or false
> (except for debunking invalid reasoning which are ffrequent there).
> My point is just that IF comp is true, THEN physics is a branch of
> number theory, and I propose a constructive prove which shows how to
> drive physics from numbers making the comp hyp. empirically refutable,
> making comp a scientific theory, in the Popper sense of "scientific".
>
> I have no doubt that digital mechanism and materialism are incompatible,
> though.
Is that because, under materialism, consciousness depends on causal links?
Brent
>
> Bruno
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
>
> >
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Received on Sun Jan 18 2009 - 00:38:29 PST