On 06 Dec 2008, at 15:30, John Mikes wrote:
> m.a. and Bruno:
>
> "BETTER OUTCOME"???
> better for whom? better than what?
> Judging human?
Judging the situation or the histories you are going through, whatever
you "really" think is better ... for you. Like it is better to drink
coffee when doing coffee, in general.
Better for the happiness of the machine, if you want. And we are not
judging any machine, it seems to me.
Bruno
>
> JohnM
>
> On Sat, Dec 6, 2008 at 8:45 AM, Bruno Marchal <marchal.domain.name.hidden>
> wrote:
>
> Le 05-déc.-08, à 14:26, M.A. a écrit :
>
> > Bruno,
> > Is it possible that as all my copies strive towards
> better
> > outcomes, the entire group advances?
>
>
> Yes (assuming QM), thanks to the notion of normality made possible by
> the QM statistics. Hopefully so with the comp hyp, but strictly
> speaking this is not yet proved.
>
>
>
> > If the worst are always proportionately opposite to the best, and
> the
> > best keep improving themselves, don't they pull the worst up with
> > them? Just a hopeful thought.
>
> But with that notion of normality, the worst should not be
> proportionately opposite to the best. If you decide to improve
> yourself, all your "you" will improve, except the unlucky one who will
> get some "white rabbits" on their way.
>
> Here, both comp and QM, is like classical statistic, and roughly
> speaking you can expect all outcomes to be possible, but with *highly*
> different proportion. If you decide to do a cup of coffee, in almost
> all histories you will drink coffee, they will be just a "little
> infinity" or little measure of worlds where the coffee will taste like
> tea, or where the boiling water will freeze.
>
> I tend to think that the ethics behind QM and comp are the same usual
> ethics of the non eliminativist materialist, except that with comp,
> such ethics can be grounded on a sort of general "modesty" principle.
> (They will be opportunity to come back on that modesty issue).
>
> A priori, the comp theory of Good/Bad is NOT like in Plotinus theory.
> Plotinus believed that if someone do something BAD, the same amount of
> BAD will occur to him, soon or later. He gives a curious example which
> is no doubt a bit shocking to our ears: he says that if a man rapes a
> woman then ... he will be reincarnated into a woman and be raped by a
> man! I think there is something true in that comment, but not if taken
> literally. With comp, I can speculate on common laws for heat, love
> and
> money: they could obey to similar global conservation principle
> together with local creation rule. But frankly this *is* speculation,
> and the main ethics will remain "respect the others and yourself" or
> things like that.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
> >
> >
> >> ----- Original Message -----
> >> From: Bruno Marchal
> >> To: everything-list.domain.name.hidden
> >> Sent: Friday, December 05, 2008 3:44 AM
> >> Subject: Re: Consciousness and free will
> >>
> >>
> >> On 04 Dec 2008, at 00:29, M.A. wrote:
> >>
> >>>
> >>> Hi Bruno,
> >>> I'm quoting your response to an older post
> because I
> >>> have a residual question. If "I" improve my ability to select the
> >>> best future outcomes, don't "I" also choose the worst ones
> according
> >>> to MWI and the rule of sum-over-histories? I seem to be competing
> >>> against myself. M.A.
> >>
> >> Assuming just Everett QM, there is a notion of normality and
> >> classicality which can be derived from the quantum evolution.
> This is
> >> expalined by david Deutsch, but also the "decoherence theory". So,
> >> when you take a (classical) decision you will act accordingly in
> the
> >> vast majority of your histories, and very few version of you will
> >> accidentally be doing the opposite.
> >> Taking into account the comp. Hyp. such "decoherence" has to be
> >> refined a priori, and this leads to a gallery of open problems.
> >> Both with QM without collapse, and with comp, such normality is
> hard
> >> to justified from the first person views when we are "near death".
> >> This leads to even more complex questions. I can only say that I
> >> don't know what happens, but I do expect, some probable "jump",
> >> guided by some theoretical computer science intuition. Some
> >> backtracking of experience, and renormalization of probabilities
> >> could also occur.
> >> Many-histories is not "all histories", or it is "all histories" but
> >> with different relative weight. We can't use MW for escaping our
> >> "responsibilities", I think.
> >>
> >>
> >> Bruno
> >>
> >>>
> >>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> At some point I could "defined" consciousness as the state of
> >>>>>>> (instinctively at first) betting on a history. This will speed
> >>>>>>> up yourself relatively to your current stories, and make
> greater
> >>>>>>> the set of your possible continuation. As an exemple you
> become
> >>>>>>> aware an asteroïd is coming nearby make it possible for you to
> >>>>>>> envisage a set of possible decisions, which can themselves
> >>>>>>> augment your probability of survival.
> >>>>>>> -
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
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> >>
> >>
> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> >>
> >>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
>
> >
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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Received on Sat Dec 06 2008 - 15:12:32 PST