Re: Consciousness and free will

From: John Mikes <jamikes.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Sat, 6 Dec 2008 09:30:03 -0500

m.a. and Bruno:

*"BETTER OUTCOME"???*
better for whom? better than what?
Judging human?

JohnM

On Sat, Dec 6, 2008 at 8:45 AM, Bruno Marchal <marchal.domain.name.hidden> wrote:

>
> Le 05-déc.-08, à 14:26, M.A. a écrit :
>
> > Bruno,
> > Is it possible that as all my copies strive towards better
> > outcomes, the entire group advances?
>
>
> Yes (assuming QM), thanks to the notion of normality made possible by
> the QM statistics. Hopefully so with the comp hyp, but strictly
> speaking this is not yet proved.
>
>
>
> > If the worst are always proportionately opposite to the best, and the
> > best keep improving themselves, don't they pull the worst up with
> > them? Just a hopeful thought.
>
> But with that notion of normality, the worst should not be
> proportionately opposite to the best. If you decide to improve
> yourself, all your "you" will improve, except the unlucky one who will
> get some "white rabbits" on their way.
>
> Here, both comp and QM, is like classical statistic, and roughly
> speaking you can expect all outcomes to be possible, but with *highly*
> different proportion. If you decide to do a cup of coffee, in almost
> all histories you will drink coffee, they will be just a "little
> infinity" or little measure of worlds where the coffee will taste like
> tea, or where the boiling water will freeze.
>
> I tend to think that the ethics behind QM and comp are the same usual
> ethics of the non eliminativist materialist, except that with comp,
> such ethics can be grounded on a sort of general "modesty" principle.
> (They will be opportunity to come back on that modesty issue).
>
> A priori, the comp theory of Good/Bad is NOT like in Plotinus theory.
> Plotinus believed that if someone do something BAD, the same amount of
> BAD will occur to him, soon or later. He gives a curious example which
> is no doubt a bit shocking to our ears: he says that if a man rapes a
> woman then ... he will be reincarnated into a woman and be raped by a
> man! I think there is something true in that comment, but not if taken
> literally. With comp, I can speculate on common laws for heat, love and
> money: they could obey to similar global conservation principle
> together with local creation rule. But frankly this *is* speculation,
> and the main ethics will remain "respect the others and yourself" or
> things like that.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
> >
> >
> >> ----- Original Message -----
> >> From: Bruno Marchal
> >> To: everything-list.domain.name.hidden
> >> Sent: Friday, December 05, 2008 3:44 AM
> >> Subject: Re: Consciousness and free will
> >>
> >>
> >> On 04 Dec 2008, at 00:29, M.A. wrote:
> >>
> >>>
> >>> Hi Bruno,
> >>> I'm quoting your response to an older post because I
> >>> have a residual question. If "I" improve my ability to select the
> >>> best future outcomes, don't "I" also choose the worst ones according
> >>> to MWI and the rule of sum-over-histories? I seem to be competing
> >>> against myself. M.A.
> >>
> >> Assuming just Everett QM, there is a notion of normality and
> >> classicality which can be derived from the quantum evolution. This is
> >> expalined by david Deutsch, but also the "decoherence theory". So,
> >> when you take a (classical) decision you will act accordingly in the
> >> vast majority of your histories, and very few version of you will
> >> accidentally be doing the opposite.
> >> Taking into account the comp. Hyp. such "decoherence" has to be
> >> refined a priori, and this leads to a gallery of open problems.
> >> Both with QM without collapse, and with comp, such normality is hard
> >> to justified from the first person views when we are "near death".
> >> This leads to even more complex questions. I can only say that I
> >> don't know what happens, but I do expect, some probable "jump",
> >> guided by some theoretical computer science intuition. Some
> >> backtracking of experience, and renormalization of probabilities
> >> could also occur.
> >> Many-histories is not "all histories", or it is "all histories" but
> >> with different relative weight. We can't use MW for escaping our
> >> "responsibilities", I think.
> >>
> >>
> >> Bruno
> >>
> >>>
> >>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> At some point I could "defined" consciousness as the state of
> >>>>>>> (instinctively at first) betting on a history. This will speed
> >>>>>>> up yourself relatively to your current stories, and make greater
> >>>>>>> the set of your possible continuation. As an exemple you become
> >>>>>>> aware an asteroïd is coming nearby make it possible for you to
> >>>>>>> envisage a set of possible decisions, which can themselves
> >>>>>>> augment your probability of survival.
> >>>>>>> -
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>> -~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~
> >>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
> >>>>> Groups "Everything List" group.
> >>>>> To post to this group, send email
> >>>>> to everything-list.domain.name.hidden
> >>>>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email
> >>>>> to everything-list+unsubscribe.domain.name.hidden<everything-list%2Bunsubscribe.domain.name.hidden>
>
> >>>>> For more options, visit this group
> >>>>> at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
> >>>>> -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
> >>>>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>
> >>
> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> >>
> >>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
> >
>

--~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list.domain.name.hidden
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscribe.domain.name.hidden
For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
Received on Sat Dec 06 2008 - 09:30:09 PST

This archive was generated by hypermail 2.3.0 : Fri Feb 16 2018 - 13:20:15 PST