Re: Consciousness and free will

From: John Mikes <jamikes.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Sun, 30 Nov 2008 11:17:53 -0500

Bruno,
I wanted to submit some reflections to M.A. but you did it better.
Two words, however, I picked out:

*1. bifurcate*
I consider it a human narrowness to expect "anything" *to split in
TWO*(only) - Nature (the existence?) does not 'count'.
It has unlimited varants and the choices come under the 2nd word I picked
out:

*2. (free?) WILL*
 The *'Free Will'* is the invention of the religious trend to invoke
responsibility and punishment.
In 'my' position-kind even 'Will" implies some personal(?) decision instead
of a deterministic *consequence of relations all over* acting upon the
observed change of the observed item.

As for the elusive *consciousness?*
'my' attempt to find some generalized and widened identification for all
those different things people (as is said)* 'everybody knows what it
is'*(but many in
*different ways* <G>), I ended up with the ID (first published 1992):
       *Acknowledgement of and response *
* to information (changes?)*
(considering it rather a process than only an 'awareness'.) I posted this on
several lists for psych, mind, consciousness, even diverse complexities and
did NOT get a refusal over the 15 years). Acceptance neither. So I thought:
Si tacent, clamant (or dormiunt?)
I hold one thing for sure: Ccness (whatever it may be) is NOT a 'thing'
callable 'physical'.

(I feel M.A. tacitly assigns to "universe,the program, or whatever" some
god-like authoritative decisionmaking role).

John M

* *
On Sat, Nov 29, 2008 at 3:49 PM, Bruno Marchal <marchal.domain.name.hidden> wrote:

>
> On 29 Nov 2008, at 16:45, M.A. wrote:
>
> *(Assuming MEC/Comp.and MWI) If the computational universe which I
> experience*
>
>
>
> Assuming MEC I would say *you* experience an infinity of computational
> histories. The term "universe" is far too ambiguous (now).
>
>
>
> *is a single instance of a vast array of similar universes playing out
> every possible variation of the initial axioms, then no one universe could
> depart from its predetermined program since in so doing it would alter its
> program and duplicate that of another universe thus spoiling the overall
> mission of implementing every possible variation.*
>
>
> Histories can bifurcate in a way that you will find yourself in both
> histories ("you" seen from some third person point of view). Each histories
> is deterministic but, your future is uncertain.
>
>
>
> *It follows that each program-universe is completely detirministic *
>
>
> All right.
>
>
>
> *and that consciousness is merely an observing passenger inside the
> program;*
>
>
>
> At some point I could "defined" consciousness as the state of
> (instinctively at first) betting on a history. This will speed up yourself
> relatively to your current stories, and make greater the set of your
> possible continuation. As an exemple you become aware an asteroïd is coming
> nearby make it possible for you to envisage a set of possible decisions,
> which can themselves augment your probability of survival.
>
>
>
> * thus each program that contains a thinking entity is in a schizophrenic
> condition. *
>
>
>
> Come on!
>
>
>
> *This is because consciousness--which is part of the program--is capable
> of judging the actions of the program. When the program acts in a way
> approved by it, *
>
>
> by it?
>
>
> *the thinker is encouraged to believe that its free will produced the
> action. *
>
>
> ?
>
>
>
> *But when the program acts in a manner repugnant to it,*
>
>
>
> to who?
>
>
> *the conscious observer, refusing to give up the notion of free will,
> explains the lapse by rationalizations such as: God, luck, destiny,
> possession, halluciation etc. *
>
>
> As far as I understand, the program here acknowledge its ignorance. If, by
> being too much proud, he doesn't, then he make higher some catastrophe
> probabilities.
>
>
>
> *So every consciousness, bearing burdensome memories of repugnant
> actions, must either surrender the possibility of free will (fatalism),*
>
>
> Wrongly, I would say.
>
>
>
> *accept the intercession of supernatural powers (theology), *
>
>
>
> "it" could just accept it belongs to a collection of deep unknown
> histories, and many other unknown things, some even not nameable (and deadly
> if named). It can consolate itself by pointing on its *partial* control.
>
> Note also that it is not really the program or the machine who thinks, but
> the people "vehiculated" trough that machine computation relatively to its
> most probable (and local) computational histories.
>
>
>
> *or theorize an inaccessible part of itself that is able to override
> its purposes (Freud). *
>
>
>
> That is not entirely meaningless imo.
>
>
>
> *All of which implies a schism between consciousness and one of the
> following: the program, the universe or itself.*
>
>
>
> Here I agree. Universal machine are born to experience such a schism. We
> can come back on this. In its purer form it is a consequence of
> incompleteness. All universal machine hides a mystery to themselves, and
> more the machine learn, more that mystery is bigger. (This is related to the
> gap between G and G*, for those who reminds previous explanations).
>
>
> **
> *I'd be interested to know to what extent my thinking about this question
> agrees with or goes against the present discussion.*
> **
>
>
> *m.a.*
>
>
>
> I made a try. Interesting post. Tell me if you are ok with it. (I believe
> in free will, but I would prefer to say simply just "will". Free-will is a
> bit of an oxymoron).
>
> Bruno
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
>
> >
>

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Received on Sun Nov 30 2008 - 11:17:58 PST

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