Brent wrote:
...
*"But is causality an implementation detail? There seems to be an implicit
assumption that digitally represented states form a sequence just because
there
is a rule that defines(*) that sequence, but in fact all digital (and other)
sequences depend on(**) causal chains." ...*
I would insert at (*): *'in digitality'* -
and at (**):
*'(the co-interefficiency of) unlimited'* - because in my vocabulary (and I
do not expect the 'rest of the world to accept it) the conventional term *
'causality'*, meaning to find *"A CAUSE"* within the (observed) topical
etc. model that entails the (observed) 'effect' - gave place to the
unlimited inteconnections that - in their total interefficiency - result in
the effect we observed within a model-domain, irrespective of the limits of
the observed domain.
"Cause" - IMO - is a limited term of ancient narrow epistemic (model
based?) views, not fit for discussions in a "TOE"-oriented style.
Using obsolete words impress the coclusions as well.
John Mikes
On Thu, Nov 27, 2008 at 3:43 PM, Brent Meeker <meekerdb.domain.name.hidden>wrote:
>
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >
> > On 25 Nov 2008, at 20:16, Brent Meeker wrote:
> >
> >> Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >
> >>>> Brent: I don't see why the mechanist-materialists are
> >>>> logically disallowed from incorporating that kind of physical
> >>>> difference into their notion of consciousness.
> >>>
> >>> Bruno: In our setting, it means that the neuron/logic gates have
> >>> some form of
> >>> prescience.
> >> Brent: I'm not sure I agree with that. If consciousness is a
> >> process it may be
> >> instantiated in physical relations (causal?). But relations are in
> >> general not
> >> attributes of the relata. Distance is an abstract relation but it
> >> is always
> >> realized as the distance between two things. The things themselves
> >> don't have
> >> "distance". If some neurons encode my experience of "seeing a rose"
> >> might not
> >> the experience depend on the existence of roses, the evolution of
> >> sight, and the
> >> causal chain as well as the immediate state of the neurons?
> >
> >
> > With *digital* mechanism, it would just mean that we have not chosen
> > the right level of substitution. Once the level is well chosen, then
> > we can no more give role to the implementations details. They can no
> > more be relevant, or we introduce prescience in the elementary
> > components.
>
> But is causality an implementation detail? There seems to be an implicit
> assumption that digitally represented states form a sequence just because
> there
> is a rule that defines that sequence, but in fact all digital (and other)
> sequences depend on causal chains.
>
> >
> >
> >>>
> >>>> Bostrom's views about fractional
> >>>> "quantities" of experience are a case in point.
> >>> If that was true, why would you say "yes" to the doctor without
> >>> knowing the thickness of the artificial axons?
> >>> How can you be sure your consciousness will not half diminish when
> >>> the
> >>> doctor proposes to you the new cheaper brain which use thinner
> >>> fibers,
> >>> or half the number of redundant security fibers (thanks to a progress
> >>> in security software)?
> >>> I would no more dare to say "yes" to the doctor if I could loose a
> >>> fraction of my consciousness and become a partial zombie.
> >> But who would say "yes" to the doctor if he said that he would take
> >> a movie of
> >> your brain states and project it? Or if he said he would just
> >> destroy you in
> >> this universe and you would continue your experiences in other
> >> branches of the
> >> multiverse or in platonia? Not many I think.
> >
> >
> > I agree with you. Not many will say yes to such a doctor! Even
> > rightly so (with MEC). I think MGA 3 should make this clear.
> > The point is just that if we assume both MEC *and* MAT, then the
> > movie is "also" conscious, but of course (well: by MGA 3) it is not
> > conscious "qua computatio", so that we get the (NON COMP or NON MAT)
> > conclusion.
>
> It's not so clear to me. One argument leads to CONSCIOUS and the other
> leads to
> NON-CONSCIOUS, but there is not direct contradiction - only a contradiction
> of
> intuitions. So it may be a fault of intuition in evaluating the thought
> experiments.
>
> Brent
>
>
>
> >
> > I keep COMP (as my working hypothesis, but of course I find it
> > plausible for many reasons), so I abandon MAT. With comp,
> > consciousness can still supervene on computations (in Platonia, or
> > more concretely in the universal deployment), but not on its physical
> > implementation. By UDA we have indeed the obligation now to explain
> > the physical, by the computational. It is the reversal I talked about.
> > Somehow, consciousness does not supervene on brain activity, but brain
> > activity supervene on consciousness. To be short, because
> > consciousness is now somehow related with the whole of arithmetical
> > truth, and things are no so simple.
> >
> > Bruno
> > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > >
> >
>
>
> >
>
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Received on Thu Nov 27 2008 - 17:08:01 PST