Bruno,
So, basically, you are saying that I'm offering an alternative
argument against materialism, correct? Supposing that reality has a
purely mathematical basis eliminates the problem, because removing the
past is like removing the number 13.
You say that the argument by counterfactuals won't work, thanks to
Olympization... I don't know what Olympization is, so I'd like to hear
the argument.
As for the remainder of your comments, I suppose I'll just have to go read UDA.
--Abram
On Thu, Nov 27, 2008 at 3:37 PM, Bruno Marchal <marchal.domain.name.hidden> wrote:
> Hi Abram,
>
> On 27 Nov 2008, at 20:02, Abram Demski wrote:
>
> Bruno,
>
> It seems to me that this runs head-on into the problem of the
> definition of time...
>
> Here is my argument; I am sure there will be disagreement with it.
>
> Supposing that Alice's consciousness is spread out over the movie
> billboards next to the train track, there is no longer a normal
> temporal relationship between mental moments. There must merely be a
> "time-like" relationship, which Alice experiences as time.
>
> Assuming MAT (and MEC). OK.
>
>
> But, then,
> we are saying that wherever a logical relationship exists that is
> time-like, there is subjective time for those inside the time-like
> relationship.
>
> With MAT, (in a block view or not). OK.
>
>
>
>
> Now, what might constitute a time-like relationship? I see several
> alternatives, but none seem satisfactory.
>
> At any given moment, all we can be directly aware of is that one
> moment. If we remember the past, that is because at the present moment
> our brain has those memories; we don't know if they "really" came from
> the past. What would it mean to put moments in a series? It changes
> nothing essential about the moment itself; we can remove the past,
> because it adds nothing.
>
> With MAT! As Stathis said, once consciousness supervenes on mathematical
> computations (up to some equivalence class), you can no more remove a past
> than you can remove the number 13 from elementary arithmetic.
>
>
>
>
> The connection between moments doesn't seem like a physical
> connection; the notion is non-explanatory, since if there were such a
> physical connection we could remove it without altering the individual
> moments, therefore not altering our memories, and our subjective
> experience of time.
>
> All right.
>
>
>
> Similarly, can it be a logical relationship? Is it
> the structure of a single moment that connects it to the next? How
> would this be? Perhaps we require that there is some function (a
> "physics") from one moment to the next?
>
> It is here that we have to take into account what I think to be a major
> discovery, if not THE first big(**) discovery of humanity: the discovery
> of the (mathematical) Universal Machine (of Turing, if you want, but with
> Church thesis it is considerably more general).
> That concept makes it possible to define a "space" of all computations. It
> is defined unambiguously by the Universal Dovetailer, a program itself. Or
> equivalently by the set of sigma_1 sentences and their proofs (note that the
> false sigma_1 sentences inherit infinite proofs).
> Now, consider some trace of that program. It executes all computations. But
> (see the UDA), from our personal point of view, even between just two
> distinguishable computational states, there will be a continuum of
> computations going through those states, if only due to the "dumbness" of
> the UD, who re-execute each step of any computation by dovetailing them on
> all "real" oracle. And MEC predict that this "mutiplication" of computations
> appearing below our substitution level is indirectly observable.
>
>
>
> But, this does not exactly
> allow for things like relativity in which there is no single universal
> clock.
>
> (Sure, but we were trying to suppose here only MEC + MAT (not MEC + MAT +
> relativity). And this points to a little weakness of the second argument I
> gave.
> But I would find only funny to just conclude that the falsity of relativity
> would safe "MAT". That would be a type of ad hoc move I was hoping to
> exclude in some dreamy "MGA 5" some posts ago.
>
>
> Of course, relativity could be simulated, creating a universe
> that was run be a universal clock but whose internal facts did not
> depend on which universal clock, exactly, the simulation was run from.
>
> You have to read the UDA here I'm afraid: no "emulable physical reality" can
> save the problem. With MEC, "physical reality" has to emerge from ALL
> emulable histories, and this, as viewed by any universal machine, is really
> an infinite sum. That sum is hardly emulable, a priori, but I agree that
> quantum mechanics seems to show that such a sum is perhaps emulable (albeit
> with exponential slow down) by the sharable indeterminate part making our
> probable sharable neighborhood.
> MEC has everything to justify it, or to refute it (in which case the success
> of quantum computing would confirm or refute MEC). Up to now, QM confirms
> MEC (I can say more precise technical things here if interested).
>
>
>
> My problem is, I suppose, that any particular definition of "timelike
> relationship" seems too arbitrary.
>
> There is a big difference between first person non sharable time, and
> sharable local (clock measurable) time. The first you experience, the second
> you guess, and you guess it only from an implicit bet on your own
>
> consistency. It makes a big "modal" difference.
>
>
>
> As another example, should any
> probabilistic elements be allowed into physics? In this case, we don't
> have a function any more, but a relation-- perhaps a relation of
> weighted transitions. But how would this relation make any difference
> from inside the universe?
>
>
> We are supported by infinity(*) of computations. We can only bet on our
> most probable "histories", above our level of constitution. Those historie
> which can multiplie themselves from below, and thus in front of pure
> probabilistic event (noise) can win the measure game (on the computations or
> the OMs). The question is: can we explain from MEC, as we have too, why, as
> we can see empirically, the "probabilities" can also be subtracted. To we
> get here too classical mechanics in the limit? Open problem of course.
> Now the crazy thing is that we can already (thanks to Gödel, Löb, Solovay
> ...) interview a (Lobian) universal machine on that subject, and she gives a
> shadow of reason (and guess!) why indeed subtraction occurs. And thanks to
> the Solovay split between G (the provable part of self-reference, and G*,
> the true but unprovable part of self-reference, some intensional variant of
> G and G* split temselves into the sharable physics (indeteminate quanta) and
> unsharable physics (the qualia? the perceptible field, what you can only be
> the one to confim: a bit like being the one in Moscow after a
> self-duplication experiment).
>
> Bruno
>
> (*) Even infinitIES, from the "third person point of view on the first
> person points of view. Hmmm do you know the first person comp indeterminacy?
> (step 3 of UDA).
> (**) The second BIG discovery being the quantum computer ! (don't hesitate
> to use grain salts if it helps to swallows what I say). of course "nature"
> made those discoveries before us. Well, with MEC we have to consider that
> elementary arithmetic did those "discoveries" even out of time and space.
>
>
>
>
>
> On Wed, Nov 26, 2008 at 4:09 AM, Bruno Marchal <marchal.domain.name.hidden> wrote:
>
> MGA 3
>
> It is the last MGA !
>
> I realize MGA is complete, as I thought it was, but I was doubting this
>
> recently. We don't need to refer to Maudlin, and MGA 4 is not necessary.
>
> Maudlin 1989 is an independent argument of the 1988 Toulouse argument (which
>
> I present here).
>
> Note that Maudlin's very interesting "Olympization technic" can be used to
>
> defeat a wrong form of MGA 3, that is, a wrong argument for the assertion
>
> that the movie cannot be conscious. (the argument that the movie lacks the
>
> counterfactual). Below are hopefully correct (if not very simple) argument.
>
> ( I use Maudlin sometimes when people gives this non correct form of MGA 3,
>
> and this is probably what makes me think Maudlin has to be used, at some
>
> point).
>
>
>
> MGA 1 shows that Lucky Alice is conscious, and MGA 2 shows that the
>
> "luckiness" feature of the MGA 1 experiment was a red herring. We can
>
> construct, from MEC+COMP, an home made lucky rays generator, and use it at
>
> will. If we accept both digital mechanism, in particular Dennet's principle
>
> that neurons have no intelligence, still less prescience, and this
>
> *together with* the supervenience principle; we have to accept that Alice
>
> conscious dream experience supervenes on the projection of her brain
>
> activity movie.
>
> Let us show now that Alice consciousness *cannot* supervene on that
>
> *physical* movie projection.
>
>
> I propose two (deductive) arguments.
>
> 1)
>
> Mechanism implies the following tautological functionalist principle: if,
>
> for some range of activity, a system does what it is supposed to do, and
>
> this before and after a change is made in its constitution, then the change
>
> does not change what the system is supposed to do, for that range of
>
> activity.
>
> Example:
>
> - A car is supposed to broken but only if the driver is faster than 90
>
> miles/h. Pepe Pepito NEVER drives faster than 80 miles/h. Then the car is
>
> supposed to do what she is supposed to do, with respect of its range of
>
> activity defined by Pepe Pepito.
>
> - Claude bought a 1000 thousand processors computer. One day he realized
>
> that he used only 990 processors, for his type of activity, so he decided to
>
> get rid of those 10 useless processors. And indeed the machine will satisfy
>
> Claude ever.
>
> - Alice has (again) a math exam. Theoreticians have correctly predict that
>
> in this special circumstance, she will never use neurons X, Y and Z. Now
>
> Alice go (again, again) to this exam in the same condition, but with the
>
> neurons X, Y, Z removed. Again, not only will she behaved like if she
>
> succeed her exam, but her consciousness, with both MEC *and* MAT still
>
> continue.
>
> The idea is that if something is not useful, for an active process to go on,
>
> for some range of activity, then you can remove it, for that range of
>
> activity.
>
> OK?
>
> Now, consider the projection of the movie of the activity of Alice's brain,
>
> "the movie graph".
>
> Is it necessary that someone look at that movie? Certainly not. No more than
>
> it is needed that someone is look at your reconstitution in Moscow for you
>
> to be conscious in Moscow after a teleportation. All right? (with MEC
>
> assumed of course).
>
> Is it necessary to have a screen? Well, the range of activity here is just
>
> one dynamical description of one computation. Suppose we make a hole in the
>
> screen. What goes in and out of that hole is exactly the same, with the hole
>
> and without the hole. For that unique activity, the hole in the screen is
>
> functionally equivalent to the subgraph which the hole removed. Clearly we
>
> can make a hole as large as the screen, so no need for a screen.
>
> But this reasoning goes through if we make the hole in the film itself.
>
> Reconsider the image on the screen: with a hole in the film itself, you get
>
> a "hole" in the movie, but everything which enters and go out of the hole
>
> remains the same, for that (unique) range of activity. The "hole" has
>
> trivially the same functionality than the subgraph functionality whose
>
> special behavior was described by the film. And this is true for any
>
> subparts, so we can remove the entire film itself.
>
> Does Alice's dream supervene (in real time and space) on the projection of
>
> the empty movie?
>
> Remark.
>
> 1° Of course, this argument can be sum up by saying that the movie lacks
>
> causality between its parts so that it cannot really be said that it
>
> computes any thing, at least physically. The movie is just an ordered record
>
> of computational states. This is neither a physical computation, nor an
>
> (immaterial) computation where the steps follows relatively to some
>
> universal machine. It is just a description of a computation, already
>
> existing in the Universal Deployment.
>
> 2° Note this: If we take into consideration the relative destiny of Alice,
>
> and supposing one day her brain broke down completely, she has more chance
>
> to survive through "holes in the screen" than to the "holes in the film".
>
> The film contains the relevant information to reconstitute Alice from her
>
> brain description, contained on this high resolution film. Keeping comp, and
>
> abandoning the physical supervenience thesis, means that we do no more
>
> associate consciousness, neither on the movie, NOR on the brain special
>
> activity in a computation, but to the computation itself directly. A brain,
>
> and even a film, will "only" be a way to make bigger the probability
>
> for a consciousness to manifest itself relatively to a "probable" universal
>
> computational history.
>
> Strictly speaking, running the movie dimimish Alice chance to have her
>
> conscious experience (life) continue, at least relatively to you, because of
>
> the many scratches the projector makes on the pellicle, which remove
>
> relevant information for a safe reconstitution later (again relatively to
>
> you).
>
>
> 2)
>
> I give now what is perhaps a simpler argument
>
> A projection of a movie is a relative phenomenon. On the planet 247a, nearby
>
> in the galaxy, they don't have screen. The film pellicle is as big as a
>
> screen, and they make the film passing behind a stroboscope at the right
>
> frequency in front of the public. But on planet 247b, movies are only for
>
> travellers! They dress their film, as big as those on planet 247a, in their
>
> countries all along their train rails with a lamp besides each frames, which
>
> is nice because from the train, through its speed, you get the usual 24
>
> frames per second. But we already accepted that such movie does not need to
>
> be observed, the train can be empty of people. Well the train does not play
>
> any role, and what remains is the static film with a lamp behind each frame.
>
> Are the lamps really necessaries? Of course not, all right? So now we are
>
> obliged to accept that the consciousness of Alice during the projection of
>
> the movie supervenes of something completely inert in time and space. This
>
> contradicts the *physical* supervenience thesis.
>
>
> Exercises.
>
> a) Someone could propose an alternate argument that a movie does not compute
>
> (and so consciousness does supervene on it) by alluding to the lack of
>
> causality in the movie: the movie does not handle the counterfactual
>
> existing implicitly in computations (physical or not). Use Maudlin's
>
> Olympization technic to refute that argument.
>
> b) Make fun by using a non dreaming Alice. Shows that the movie (film or
>
> screen) graph border is needed to get the accidental zombies (the puppet).
>
> And then the "important" exercise (the original goal).
>
> c) Eliminate the hypothesis "there is a concrete deployment" in the seventh
>
> step of the UDA. Use UDA(1...7) to define properly the computationalist
>
> supervenience thesis. Hint: reread the remarks above.
>
> Have a good day.
>
>
> Bruno
>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
> >
>
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Received on Thu Nov 27 2008 - 17:06:29 PST