>
>
> >>
> >>
> >> I'm new in town, and it's a delight to follow your discussions!
> >>
> >> On free will:
> >>
> >> I'm inclined to doubt that free will as usually conceived is a coherent
> >> idea. On the one hand, 'freedom', as a property pertaining to alterations
> >> of mental states, connotes a mysterious suspension of causal influence from
> >> the rest of the world. On the other hand, however, few would accept an
> >> analysis in terms of _randomly_ engendered alterations.
> >>
>
> At 12:19 14.12.99 +1100, Russell Standish wrote:
> >
> >Putting in the idea of downward causation is assuming something about
> >how free will might work, so I'd be reluctant to assume this from the
> >outset. All I mean by free will is that _I_ am able to make
> >decisions. This is a phenomenon of the 1st person, and one that can be
> >explained in a number of ways. One way is to say that this phenomenon
> >is an illusion, however that answer is too glib for me. I have stated
> >my own view on this, which is heavily influenced by Deutsch, so I
> >won't repeat it here.
>
> >The special connection relates to reconciling determinism and free
> >will. Free will is of course completely possible in a
> >non-deterministic single universe.
>
>
> As I don't want to sidetrack the other debates, and suppose you've discussed
> the compatibilism/incompatibilism issue before, I'll try to be brief:
>
> If by free will you mean only your own ability to make decisions, it's hard
> to see how determinism could hamper it. My oven is itself producing heat
> however much it was predetermined. Similarly, you can make decisions even
> though the content of those decisions are predetermined by the laws and
> constants of physics: All it takes is for your option set to be >1 in the
> relevant situations. Thus free will as decision-making is completely
> possible also in a deterministic single universe, and there should be no
> need to invoke MW.
My question is - how can one's option set be >1 in a completely
determined single track universe? It seems some level of indeterminsim
is required.
>
> In addition, the decision-making process comes with an experience of
> autonomous
> initiative that would perhaps have no equivalent in a conscious oven. It
> is _this_ experience that may be illusory (cfr. epiphenomenalism), and that
> I suggest might be explained by emergence as downward causation. Please
> excuse if I'm missing something obvious, but I can't see how the SW/MW
> distinction makes any difference whatsoever in this context. Deutsch also
> tries to analyze normative statements in terms of observer state
> probabilities, which is even more unworkable for my money: QM does not
> take you from "is" to "ought" any more than do General Relativity or
> Thermodynamics.
>
> Please note: I expect no replies if you have been through this sort of
> stuff before!
>
>
> --
> Gisle Tangenes
>
>
I don't think this issue has been gone into in any greater depth in
this discussion group, however I also feel this may be wandering a bit
off-topic for my taste.
Cheers
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dr. Russell Standish Director
High Performance Computing Support Unit,
University of NSW Phone 9385 6967
Sydney 2052 Fax 9385 6965
Australia R.Standish.domain.name.hidden
Room 2075, Red Centre
http://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks
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Received on Tue Dec 14 1999 - 14:47:29 PST