>From: Fred Chen <flipsu5.domain.name.hidden>
>To: Fritz Griffith <fritzgriffith.domain.name.hidden>
>CC: everything-list.domain.name.hidden
>Subject: Re: Heed Clarification on MW
>Date: Mon, 13 Dec 1999 02:28:04 -0800
>
>
>
>Fritz Griffith wrote:
>
> > >From: Russell Standish <R.Standish.domain.name.hidden>
> > >To: jqm1584.domain.name.hidden (Jacques M. Mallah)
> > >CC: everything-list.domain.name.hidden
> > >Subject: Re: Heed Clarification on MW
> > >Date: Mon, 13 Dec 1999 17:02:59 +1100 (EST)
> > >
> > > >
> > > > On Wed, 8 Dec 1999, Russell Standish wrote:
> > > > > > In a MW or all-universe model, all your decisions can do is to
> > >change
> > > > > > the percentage of people-like-you who do certain things, or
> > >equivalently
> > > > > > the percentage of universes in which people-like-you have taken
> > >various
> > > > > > actions.
> > > > >
> > > > > I disagree with this statement strongly. The evolution of the MW
>model
> > > > > is completely deterministic, and the ratios of measures of
>different
> > > > > worlds is completely determined at the start.
> > > >
> > > > I discussed this one, decision theory in the MWI, with Wei Dai
> > > > pretty thoroughly a while ago; look it up.
> > > > Basically, your decisions *do* still determine the outcome, just
> > > > like in a single-universe deterministic model. Which is the same as
> > > > saying that the laws of physics + initial conditions determine the
> > > > outcome; just another way of talking about the same thing, as you
>are
> > >not
> > > > something outside of physics.
> > >
> > >According to your following paragraph, we don't have free will, so
> > >therefore there are no decisions we can make to affect the evolution
> > >of the state function. You contradict yourself!
> > >
> >
> > I think what Jacques is saying makes sense. He's saying that we don't
>have
> > free will because everything we decide is completely determined by the
>same
> > laws of physics as everything else. However, since our decisions still
>do
> > happen, they affect the evolution of things that happen around us. For
> > example, if I decide to drop a glass cup, the decision to do that would
> > occur due to the laws of physics, and not because of free will.
>
>If you decide to drop the cup you satisfy the laws of physics. If you
>decide
>notto drop the cup, you satisfy the laws of physics. If the laws of physics
>didn't allow
>more than one outcome, how can you talk about splitting?
>From a 1st-person point of view, no splitting does occur. We only view one
world. Splitting only occurs from a 3rd-person point of view, where we see
that in one world we dropped the cup and in the other we didn't.
>
> > But
> > dropping that glass cup would cause it to shatter on the ground. So,
>your
> > deterministic decisions have an effect on the state function.
> >
> > > >
> > > > > What your free will does is affect the likelihood of what branch
>your
> > > > > 1st person experience will take. Free will is a 1st person
>phenomenon,
> > > > > not a 3rd person phenomenon.
> > > >
> > > > There is no free will; in fact, as I say above, realizing that
> > > > solves the problem. As for "1st person" you will not be surprised
>that
> > >I
> > > > see no basis for such distinctions.
> > > >
> > >
> > >This is rubbish. There is free will. For example I can choose to look
> > >at a photon using a left circularly polarised filter or a right
> > >circularly polarised filter. The physics fills in what I see from some
> > >probability distribution based on the state function.
> > >
> > >Now however you choose to explain this, it is a phenomenon of free
> > >will.
> > >
> >
> > No matter what you call it, I believe that our decisions are still
> > deterministic. The illusion of free will occurs because the more
>sensible
> > decisions are of higher probability, according to QM. No, this cannot
>be
> > proven, but you seem to believe that our decisions are *not*
>deterministic,
> > and this cannot be proven either. But it seems more sensible to me to
> > assume that our decisions follow the laws that everything else does.
>
>Our decisions are subject to the same laws. I don't know what prior you
>woulduse
>to determine the probabilities of your decision, but it would seem to vary
>from
>person to person.
>
> >
> >
> > >How I chose to explain this is that free will is a 1st person
> > >phenomenon, and doesn't exist at all in the 3rd person world. An
> > >analogy here is that centrifugal force exists in a rotating frame of
> > >reference, but not a static one. It is a mistake to say that
> > >centrifugal force therefore does not exist (as I've heard certain high
> > >school teacher assert).
> >
> > I don't really see how this analogy has any relevance to our discussion.
> >
> > While we're on this topic, I'd like a little clarification on something.
> > All of this discussion is assuming that only worlds branching off of our
> > world are possible. But from a 3rd-person perspective, aren't they ALL
> > possible, but some just not possible for us (from a 1st-person
>perspective)?
> > Looking at it from a 3rd-person point of view, the decision not to
>commit
> > quantum suicide because you'd leave loved ones behind doesn't hold
>anymore.
> > Sure, you'd leave loved ones behind, but if you decided not to do it,
>there
> > would still be another world where you decided to do it, and left loved
>ones
> > behind. So it makes no difference either way.
> >
>
>You brought this up before. I didn't quite understand earlier, but now it
>seemsclearer in this context. If you have two logically incompatible
>worlds,
>you can't hold both to be true, from a 1st person perspective. From a 3rd
>person
>perspective, S and ~S are both true; everything would be true. So this
>perspective
>is not helpful for decisions (which are 1st person actions anyway).
>
>Fred
ok... so it would be correct to view this as saying that if you decide to
commit quantum suicide, then because your decisions are determined by
probability laws (non free-will view), the very fact that you decided to
commit quantum suicide means that the probability of deciding to do it is
probably greater than the probability of deciding not to. So deciding not
to commit quantum suicide is effectively 'giving' that decision a higher
measure than the opposite decision. Would this be correct?
>
> > >
> > > > - - - - - - -
> > > > Jacques Mallah (jqm1584.domain.name.hidden)
> > > > Graduate Student / Many Worlder / Devil's Advocate
> > > > "I know what no one else knows" - 'Runaway Train', Soul Asylum
> > > > My URL: http://pages.nyu.edu/~jqm1584/
> > > >
> > > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> >
> >----------------------------------------------------------------------------
> > >Dr. Russell Standish Director
> > >High Performance Computing Support Unit,
> > >University of NSW Phone 9385 6967
> > >Sydney 2052 Fax 9385 6965
> > >Australia R.Standish.domain.name.hidden
> > >Room 2075, Red Centre
>http://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks
> >
> >----------------------------------------------------------------------------
> > >
> >
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Received on Mon Dec 13 1999 - 10:06:44 PST