Re: tautology

From: Russell Standish <R.Standish.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Wed, 8 Dec 1999 11:54:05 +1100 (EST)

>
> In a message dated 12/05/1999 8:57:28 PM Pacific Standard Time,
> R.Standish.domain.name.hidden writes:
>
>
> >
> > There is an obvious normalisation problem with the usual model of
> > branching histories in MWI (I see from your signature you at least
> > accept that!). Since the total number of histories (belonging to say a
> > particular observer) is some exponentially growing function of time,
> > and extends indefinitely into the future, the total measure of an
> > observer is unnormalisable, without some renormalisation applied at
> > each "timestep" (which seems rather arbitrary - unless you've got some
> > better ideas). Your measure argument, which is a variation of the
> > Leslie-Carter Doomsday argument, implicitly relies on a normalised
> > measure distribution of observer moments. I seem to remember this
> > normalisation problem was discussed earlier this year, but I'm not
> > sure (without rereading large tracts of the archives)
> >
> > Now, with RSSA, this normalisation problem is not an issue, as only
> > the relative measures between successive time steps is important, not
> > the overall measure.
> >
>
> I agree that there is a problem with the conventional concept of the MWI
> which support an asymmetrical view of time. According to this concept,
> branching generates an ever increasing number of worlds and identities. ID
> splitting is allowed but ID "merging" is not. Yet I find much more satisfying
> to believe in a time symmetrical world in which spitting and merging occur
> with equal frequency.

In the multiverse, everything is symmetric, and there is no
splitting. There isn't even a concept of time, except as an abstract
coordinate. Splitting is a psychological process rooted at the
SAS. The SAS must have an irreversible flow of time (this statement
could do with some justification, however it is what I believe in),
and imposes that irreversibility on that part of the multiverse it sees.

>
> Just as an aside I would like to go back to Bruno's amoeba analogy in which
> he illustrated the feeling one has in a splitting Many Worlds with the
> question: "how does it feel to be an amoeba after it splits?" Using the same
> analogy to illustrate merging worlds, I could ask "how does it feel to be an
> egg after it's fertilized?" (reminds me of one of Woody Allen's movies. :-))
>
> George Levy
>
>



----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dr. Russell Standish Director
High Performance Computing Support Unit,
University of NSW Phone 9385 6967
Sydney 2052 Fax 9385 6965
Australia R.Standish.domain.name.hidden
Room 2075, Red Centre http://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks
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Received on Tue Dec 07 1999 - 16:52:17 PST

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