Re: tautology

From: Russell Standish <>
Date: Wed, 8 Dec 1999 11:54:05 +1100 (EST)

> In a message dated 12/05/1999 8:57:28 PM Pacific Standard Time,
> writes:
> >
> > There is an obvious normalisation problem with the usual model of
> > branching histories in MWI (I see from your signature you at least
> > accept that!). Since the total number of histories (belonging to say a
> > particular observer) is some exponentially growing function of time,
> > and extends indefinitely into the future, the total measure of an
> > observer is unnormalisable, without some renormalisation applied at
> > each "timestep" (which seems rather arbitrary - unless you've got some
> > better ideas). Your measure argument, which is a variation of the
> > Leslie-Carter Doomsday argument, implicitly relies on a normalised
> > measure distribution of observer moments. I seem to remember this
> > normalisation problem was discussed earlier this year, but I'm not
> > sure (without rereading large tracts of the archives)
> >
> > Now, with RSSA, this normalisation problem is not an issue, as only
> > the relative measures between successive time steps is important, not
> > the overall measure.
> >
> I agree that there is a problem with the conventional concept of the MWI
> which support an asymmetrical view of time. According to this concept,
> branching generates an ever increasing number of worlds and identities. ID
> splitting is allowed but ID "merging" is not. Yet I find much more satisfying
> to believe in a time symmetrical world in which spitting and merging occur
> with equal frequency.

In the multiverse, everything is symmetric, and there is no
splitting. There isn't even a concept of time, except as an abstract
coordinate. Splitting is a psychological process rooted at the
SAS. The SAS must have an irreversible flow of time (this statement
could do with some justification, however it is what I believe in),
and imposes that irreversibility on that part of the multiverse it sees.

> Just as an aside I would like to go back to Bruno's amoeba analogy in which
> he illustrated the feeling one has in a splitting Many Worlds with the
> question: "how does it feel to be an amoeba after it splits?" Using the same
> analogy to illustrate merging worlds, I could ask "how does it feel to be an
> egg after it's fertilized?" (reminds me of one of Woody Allen's movies. :-))
> George Levy

Dr. Russell Standish Director
High Performance Computing Support Unit,
University of NSW Phone 9385 6967
Sydney 2052 Fax 9385 6965
Room 2075, Red Centre
Received on Tue Dec 07 1999 - 16:52:17 PST

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