Re: Simplicity, the infinite and the everything (42x)

From: Quentin Anciaux <allcolor.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Wed, 13 Aug 2008 22:47:00 +0200

When the universe will end is '17 is prime' still true ?

Me winning the lotery is a WR event... I play lotery, I do not win
therefore no one wins... It's basically your argument about WR.

2008/8/13 1Z <peterdjones.domain.name.hidden>:
>
>
>
> On 13 Aug, 21:05, "Quentin Anciaux" <allco....domain.name.hidden> wrote:
>> 2008/8/13 1Z <peterdjo....domain.name.hidden>:
>>
>> >> Sure, why one then ?
>>
>> > It would be the smallest number that fits the facts.
>>
>> Which facts ?
>
> The observed ones.

You're talking about the microscopic quantum world ?

>> >> >> >> > it is not simpler on the "entity" version of O's R, and it does not
>> >> >> >> > fit the evidence because of the WR problem.
>>
>> >> >> >> Yes but I see 'real switch' problem as equally problematic in front of
>> >> >> >> the WR problem.
>>
>> >> >> > I don't see that. You need to explain. Single-worlders can "switch
>> >> >> > off" WR's.
>>
>> >> >> Yes by saying it's a no problem... I can say MW can "switch off" WR as
>> >> >> easily. But we just make a step back and forth.
>>
>> >> > That is no explanation. Single worlders -- and physical many
>> >> > worlders--
>> >> > get rid of WR universes by saying they do no exist at all.
>>
>> >> > Now: don't tell me *that* mathematical may worlders can do
>> >> > the same, tell me how.
>>
>> >> By saying they exists but you're not in the class of observer capable
>> >> of experiencing them (or experiencing them for a long stable period of
>> >> time...),
>>
>> >> and as a RSSA proponents, next states probabilities are
>> >> relative to current state... I could also say that you experience only
>> >> one world/history (from your point of view of course) then speaking
>> >> why you're not in these particular WR universes/histories is because
>> >> you're not (it sounds like your 'do not exist at all' no ? :)
>>
>> > A lot of complicated hypotheses have been put forward on the
>> > MMW side. What does that buy you? Ontological complexity combined
>> > with
>> > theoretical complexity.
>>
>> I see real complexity in asserting the single universe.
>
> Don't just see it, explain it.

I already did, one universe put more constraint because of its unicity
than infinitely many...

>> >> >> >> >> No you devise this in 2 parts, I think only the abstract world is
>> >> >> >> >> ontologically primary.
>>
>> >> >> >> > That is your conclusions. You cannot assume it in order to
>> >> >> >> > argue for it.
>>
>> >> >> >> I do not assume them.
>>
>> >> >> > Then you need some other way of getting your multiple instantiations.
>>
>> >> >> Well I believe (note the word) that we (the mind) are a computation
>> >> >> and as such I believe in strong AI, such that we will do conscious
>> >> >> digital entities... Either these entities will be truly conscious (and
>> >> >> it is possible for them to be conscious as we have assume that
>> >> >> consciousness is a computational process) or they won't, if they won't
>> >> >> and never will be conscious, it is only possible if contrary to the
>> >> >> assumption, consciousness is not (only) a computational process. Now
>> >> >> if consciousness is a computational process and we build an AI (I
>> >> >> don't see how we couldn't if consciousness is a computation, what
>> >> >> could prevent it ?) then here you are with multiple implementations.
>>
>> >> > And if we don't build an AI, here you are without them. (And with
>> >> > computationalism still true, and without any subjective
>> >> > indeterminacy).
>>
>> >> If it is a computation explain why we wouldn't with logical
>> >> argument... if the world is not destroyed tomorrow and consciousness
>> >> is a computational process then we'll build AI....
>>
>> > There is no reason to build and AI duplicate of everybody,
>> > and there is no reason to single out me. So this is another
>> > appeal to coincidence.
>>
>> i've never said that and that's not the point. This AI could be
>> duplicated and run in multiple instance when does she die ? when you
>> pull the last plug of the last computer running it ? by pulling out
>> all devices capable of running it ? by destroying the whole everything
>> ?
>
> If you make a chain of assumptions --how willing people are to build
> AIs, how able they are, how long the universe will support such
> activities--
> then you can make the AI hypothesis look likely relative to those
> assumptions.
> But there is no necessity there. Anyone can evade the argument by
> rejecting the
> assumptions. It's basically just speculation.

The necessity is this... either it's possible or not possible at all,
if it's possible it will be done. Somewhere in some time in the
multi/universe.

>> >>you must suppose
>> >> either
>> >> 1) the end of the world before we do it
>> >> 2) or the never ever AI for unknown reason even if it is possible
>> >> because the mind is a computational process
>> >> 3) or the mind is not a computational process (or in part but
>> >> dependant on a non computational/non emulable process like an oracle
>> >> or your substance for example)..
>>
>> > Or 4) We build an AI and it isn;t me. Why shoudl it be? The odds
>> > are billions to one.
>>
>> I've never said that and it's not the point if it is you, me, Georges
>> Bush or Popeye... it's about consciousness.
>
> Nothing follows for me if someone builds and AI of someone other than
> me.
> If I am never duplicated, I suffer from no indeterminacy, and no issue
> of many
> worlds arises.I can
> quite justifiably regard myself as a single individual in a single
> reality.

That follows that if mind is a computation it is a computation :D...
that means it exists like any mathematical truth that exists for
ever... or do you mean a number exists only if someone composed of
real switch particles can think of it ? and when the unirvese will end
will 1 have 2 as successor ?

Regards,
Quentin Anciaux
-- 
All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain.
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Received on Wed Aug 13 2008 - 16:47:04 PDT

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