On 13 Aug, 21:05, "Quentin Anciaux" <allco....domain.name.hidden> wrote:
> 2008/8/13 1Z <peterdjo....domain.name.hidden>:
>
> >> Sure, why one then ?
>
> > It would be the smallest number that fits the facts.
>
> Which facts ?
The observed ones.
> >> >> >> > it is not simpler on the "entity" version of O's R, and it does not
> >> >> >> > fit the evidence because of the WR problem.
>
> >> >> >> Yes but I see 'real switch' problem as equally problematic in front of
> >> >> >> the WR problem.
>
> >> >> > I don't see that. You need to explain. Single-worlders can "switch
> >> >> > off" WR's.
>
> >> >> Yes by saying it's a no problem... I can say MW can "switch off" WR as
> >> >> easily. But we just make a step back and forth.
>
> >> > That is no explanation. Single worlders -- and physical many
> >> > worlders--
> >> > get rid of WR universes by saying they do no exist at all.
>
> >> > Now: don't tell me *that* mathematical may worlders can do
> >> > the same, tell me how.
>
> >> By saying they exists but you're not in the class of observer capable
> >> of experiencing them (or experiencing them for a long stable period of
> >> time...),
>
> >> and as a RSSA proponents, next states probabilities are
> >> relative to current state... I could also say that you experience only
> >> one world/history (from your point of view of course) then speaking
> >> why you're not in these particular WR universes/histories is because
> >> you're not (it sounds like your 'do not exist at all' no ? :)
>
> > A lot of complicated hypotheses have been put forward on the
> > MMW side. What does that buy you? Ontological complexity combined
> > with
> > theoretical complexity.
>
> I see real complexity in asserting the single universe.
Don't just see it, explain it.
> >> >> >> >> No you devise this in 2 parts, I think only the abstract world is
> >> >> >> >> ontologically primary.
>
> >> >> >> > That is your conclusions. You cannot assume it in order to
> >> >> >> > argue for it.
>
> >> >> >> I do not assume them.
>
> >> >> > Then you need some other way of getting your multiple instantiations.
>
> >> >> Well I believe (note the word) that we (the mind) are a computation
> >> >> and as such I believe in strong AI, such that we will do conscious
> >> >> digital entities... Either these entities will be truly conscious (and
> >> >> it is possible for them to be conscious as we have assume that
> >> >> consciousness is a computational process) or they won't, if they won't
> >> >> and never will be conscious, it is only possible if contrary to the
> >> >> assumption, consciousness is not (only) a computational process. Now
> >> >> if consciousness is a computational process and we build an AI (I
> >> >> don't see how we couldn't if consciousness is a computation, what
> >> >> could prevent it ?) then here you are with multiple implementations.
>
> >> > And if we don't build an AI, here you are without them. (And with
> >> > computationalism still true, and without any subjective
> >> > indeterminacy).
>
> >> If it is a computation explain why we wouldn't with logical
> >> argument... if the world is not destroyed tomorrow and consciousness
> >> is a computational process then we'll build AI....
>
> > There is no reason to build and AI duplicate of everybody,
> > and there is no reason to single out me. So this is another
> > appeal to coincidence.
>
> i've never said that and that's not the point. This AI could be
> duplicated and run in multiple instance when does she die ? when you
> pull the last plug of the last computer running it ? by pulling out
> all devices capable of running it ? by destroying the whole everything
> ?
If you make a chain of assumptions --how willing people are to build
AIs, how able they are, how long the universe will support such
activities--
then you can make the AI hypothesis look likely relative to those
assumptions.
But there is no necessity there. Anyone can evade the argument by
rejecting the
assumptions. It's basically just speculation.
> >>you must suppose
> >> either
> >> 1) the end of the world before we do it
> >> 2) or the never ever AI for unknown reason even if it is possible
> >> because the mind is a computational process
> >> 3) or the mind is not a computational process (or in part but
> >> dependant on a non computational/non emulable process like an oracle
> >> or your substance for example)..
>
> > Or 4) We build an AI and it isn;t me. Why shoudl it be? The odds
> > are billions to one.
>
> I've never said that and it's not the point if it is you, me, Georges
> Bush or Popeye... it's about consciousness.
Nothing follows for me if someone builds and AI of someone other than
me.
If I am never duplicated, I suffer from no indeterminacy, and no issue
of many
worlds arises.I can
quite justifiably regard myself as a single individual in a single
reality.
> >> >> Either you say that even if consciousness is a computation we will
> >> >> never and ever be able to replicate this phenomena (creates a digital
> >> >> consciousness) and you have to explain why or you should accept 1st
> >> >> person indeterminacy...
>
> >> > I don't have to do any of those things. I just have to point out that
> >> > it isn't particularly likely. I could be living in a fantastically
> >> > elaborate
> >> > Truman-style replica of a *physical* environment..but why should I
> >> > believe
> >> > that?
>
> >> I do not believe in that, you talk of multiverse like if it was
> >> something built for deceiving us... that's nonsense paranoia :)
>
> > But you are basing your whole argument on the future construction of
> > an AI. And
> > you are trying or persuade me that that means *I* am affected by
> > indeterminacy.
> > So the AI must be an AI of me. How is that any less solipsistic than
> > the Truman
> > Show?
>
> Where all affected, every consciousness if consciousness is
> computation, but the point is not about you... Solipsism is a negation
> of everything... I do not see MW or 1st undeterminacy as solipsistic
> but the contrary, it's asserting many mind, many consciousness, many
> computations.
>
>
>
> > Also , the fact that you reject other sceptical hypotheses is
> > irrelevant and less you
> > have a rational reason for doing so.
>
> >> > There are many sceptical hypotheses; they are all equally
> >> > likely, ie "not certainly false". Rationally they should be treated
> >> > equally,
> >> > and, since they cannot be equally true, they must be treated as
> >> > equally implausible..
>
> >> Yes and many is more rationally simpler than unicity.
>
> > YOu don't get your many without the assumption of computational
> > indeterminacy,
> > which is a sceptical hypothesis, and one that has been singled out
> > from its
> > rivals for no good reason
>
> Simplicity is good reason, but we're not agreeing on what it means :)
>
> Regards,
> Quentin Anciaux
> --
> All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain.
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Received on Wed Aug 13 2008 - 16:29:49 PDT