On 13 Aug, 00:03, "Quentin Anciaux" <allco....domain.name.hidden> wrote:
> Hi,
>
> 2008/8/13 1Z <peterdjo....domain.name.hidden>:
> > Yes, but One Universe (or at least, non-MMW) methodology does
> > not claim or pretend or wish to have 0 axioms. I aims for an
> > ontologically
> > parsimonious explanation that matches the evidence.
>
> Yes so ball at the centre... these axioms are equally valable...
> except that the finite number of universes hypothesis has to explain
> why that number (be it 1 or 42).
It doesn't have to explain it on the basis of apriori axioms. Standard
cosmology accepts
that many features fo the universe stem from contingent, essentially
unaccountable boundary conditions.
> Could you explain more precisely what is parsimonious for you ?
The non-existence of unobserved entities.
> > One Universe (or at least, non-MMW) methodology does
> > not claim or pretend or wish to have 0 axioms.
>
> Well so ?
So the 0 axiom rule may be impossible to fulfill. Which would make
other methodological approaches preferable.
> >>Besides I find very
> >> problematic the unicity.
>
> > Then you had better say what the problem is.
>
> Why one ?
The universe is all there is. How could you have more than one all-
there-is?
>why not two ? if one why stay one ? There is a single
> universe and a precise one and *only this one* and we are actually in
> it, wow lucky.
Not at all. If there is one, we must be in it, there is nowhere else
to be.
"Luck"--anthropic claims---features much more in MW thinking.
> > it is not simpler on the "entity" version of O's R, and it does not
> > fit the evidence because of the WR problem.
>
> Yes but I see 'real switch' problem as equally problematic in front of
> the WR problem.
I don't see that. You need to explain. Single-worlders can "switch
off" WR's.
> > The computation needs some sort of substrate.
>
> *Any* substrate that can be use for doing a computation. Is a program
> running in a simulated processor can know that the substrate (imagine
> it has sensor to give information about it) is simulated if the
> simulated processor gives out exactly what it should ? no... so the
> substrate is nothing.
"There is no substrate" doesn't follow from "the substrate is
unknown".
> >> No you devise this in 2 parts, I think only the abstract world is
> >> ontologically primary.
>
> > That is your conclusions. You cannot assume it in order to
> > argue for it.
>
> I do not assume them.
Then you need some other way of getting your multiple instantiations.
> > DuplicABLE is not enough. I might be dreamABLE by the butterfly as
> > well. If I am not duplicATED there is no indeterminacy. If there
> > is no serious evidence of duplication, there is no serious problem
> > of indeterminacy -- it is just speculation like the butterfly story.
>
> If mind is a computation it's a fact that conscious computation will
> be run.
Why ? Says who?
>If mind is not a computation on the other hand well yes mind
> wouldn't be duplicable so asking for potential duplicability in these
> conditions is meaningless.
> > All sorts of things are possible that I don't worry about. Why should
> > I?
>
> The question is about mind is or is not a computation and what it
> entails. You are saying mind is a computation but are rejecting
> multiple runs on the ground that there won't be any ever.
I am not claiming to be certain that there won't be. I am saying there
is no particular evidence three will be.
>.. Either you
> should dismiss the mind computation hypothesis or dismiss your
> susbtance real switch theory, they're not compatible.
They are in the absence of Multiple Instantiation and its
equivalents , such as Platonism.
> >>The only way
> >> to be sure not to be rerun is that the mind is not a computation... It
> >> can't be a computation and not imply 1st person indeterminacy.
>
> > You're doing it again...putting forward "you can't be sure of not-X"
> > as if it means "you can be sure of X".
>
> No I can be sure that if mind is a computation it is a computation in
> pure term and thus totally independent of the substrate.
Buys you nothing without actual multiple instantiations.
> > The universe we see is nowhere near as big as the Tegmark-Marechal
> > Platonia.
> > Therefore you cannot possibly lever Mathematical Many Worlds out
> > of Physical Many Worlds.
>
> nowhere as big... you've seen the entire universe or only what's in
> your light cone ?
The fact that physics picks out a small subset of mathematics as
applicable
tells me that the universe we see is nowhere near as big as the
Tegmark-Marechal
Platonia.
> >> Yes, but that's not the point, the point is assuming turing
> >> emulability of the mind/the mind is a computation hypothesis implies
> >> 1st person indeterminacy and hence many worlds/dreams.
> >
> > False. The TE alone does not imply indeterminacy. To obtain actual
> > indeterminacy,
> > you need to get actual -- not just theoretical--implementations from
> > somewhere. You need the additional hypothesis of Platonism, or
> > something else.
>
> Mind emulability implies indeterminacy (even for only two runs).
There is no evidence of a single re-run.
> > That's as much faith as any religion. You do not know that someone
> > will
> > go to the trouble of duplicating you at some point in the future.
>
> Yes so the next you is a relative state of your current computational
> state, your current state + transition rule + next state is part of an
> infinite number of computations. As Bruno is saying you are the trace
> of all those merging computations.
There is no evidence of these infinite computations.
> Regards,
> Quentin Anciaux
> --
> All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain.
>
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Received on Wed Aug 13 2008 - 12:57:09 PDT