Re: Simplicity, the infinite and the everything (42x)

From: Bruno Marchal <>
Date: Tue, 12 Aug 2008 17:21:13 +0200

  I appreciate. I am not sure this will convince people, like Peter
Jones, who assume the existence of a primary material world, and
insists that a material implementation has to exist at some level for
a computation to exist. I agree this is a poorly convincing sort of
magical hand waving, but from a logical point of view an argument of
the style of the movie-graph or Olympia is still needed.


On 10 Aug 2008, at 05:56, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

> 1) Why 1 is more than 0 and simpler than n ?
> 'Entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem'... It follows by
> looking at it in a first sight that it would means the one universe
> hypothesis is simpler than MW. Yes, one universe involves many less
> than MW (either there exists a finite number of other universes or
> infinitely many)... Then by O'R we should take the one universe
> hypothesis as simpler because requiring less universes (in this case
> 1). But it's an ill way of understanding O'R... It should be
> understood as saying something about the premises, the axioms... One
> shouldn't add an axiom unnecessarily. And in this case none of one
> univers, 42 universes or infinitely many hypothesis are simpler
> relative to each other... and O'R could not help you choose or if it
> could help for something would be to choose the 0 univers
> hypothesis... well 0 < 1 << oo and this for all values of 0 even big
> ones :)
> 2) Why turing emulability of the mind entails first person
> undeterminacy and/or MW ?
> Because if you're a computation then you're not dependant on the
> substrate of the computation... but only to the computation itself. A
> computation is substrate independant.
> Well you'd say it may be substrate independent but still it needs a
> substrate to 'exist'. Ok let's accept that, but let's return on the
> mind and on the hypothesis that the mind is a computation and the
> brain the substrate on which it is run. As a computation is substrate
> independant then what follows is if the mind is a computation it can
> be run on other computational substrate for example on a... computer
> for example. And 'the mind' wouldn't be able to tell if it is run on a
> brain or on a computer. By our hypothesis the mind is a computation,
> and a computation is dependant only on it's state and transition rule,
> if the same input is given to the same algorithm it will yield the
> same result so seeing a brain is of no help because you would see a
> brain even run somewhere else if the same input is given.
> So why this entails first person undeterminacy and/or MW ? let's
> assume we could replicate the computation of your mind (I have assume
> by hypothesis that it is a computation, so replication can be done,
> even if currently we don't have a clue and even we don't know if the
> mind is a computation... but here I assume it just for the argument to
> see what it entails) then I could execute the 'you' computation on a
> computer then if I can, I can also run the 'you' computation not only
> on one computer but on many computers. Ok so now I have at least two
> computers running the same mind (computation)... I switch off one
> computer, the mind die ? hell no, by our hypothesis mind is
> computation and the computation is still running on the other
> computer. So from the point of view of the mind unplugging one of the
> two computers didn't change a thing. Now I'm a real serail killer I
> switch of the last computer running the computation/mind... so now the
> mind die now ?? Let's say I've done a program dump before stopping the
> last computer and I decide 5 years later to rerun the computation from
> this save point and on. Wasn't the mind dead ? If it is and mind ==
> the computation, how can I have the ability to run the computation
> without it being the mind ? It means also that if you're a computation
> you can't know at which 'level' you're run (if you're run on a VM
> running in a VM running in a VM or a non emulated substrate). So if
> mind is a computation to make correct prediction about the next state
> you must take all computation having the same state into account. Even
> using the 'real switch' theory a mind could be run on different 'real'
> (composed of substance) substrate... and the mind will *have* to take
> into account these runs on real substrate to make correct prediction.
> And unplugging one real substrate run will not kill the mind,
> unplugging them all also. The only way would be to not only unplug
> them all but to garantee that it wil *never and ever* be run *again*
> (even only one).
> If I'm run on another computational substrate than
> my brain, If someone pull the plug, I die ?
> Quentin Anciaux
> --
> All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain.
> >

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Received on Tue Aug 12 2008 - 11:21:30 PDT

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