Bostrom Paper

From: GŁnther Greindl <>
Date: Wed, 02 Apr 2008 20:20:41 +0200

Dear List,

I searched through the archive, this paper does not seem to have been

Quantity of Experience: Brain-Duplication and Degrees of Consciousness

If two brains are in identical states, are there two numerically
distinct phenomenal experiences or only one? Two, I argue. But what
happens in intermediary cases? This paper looks in detail at this
question and suggests that there can be a fractional (non-integer)
number of qualitatively identical experiences. This has implications for
what it is to implement a computation and for Chalmer's Fading Qualia
thought experiment. [Minds and Machines, 2006, Vol. 16, No. 2, pp. 185-200]

It raises some issues the UDA is concerned with.
What do you think of it?

Best Regards,

GŁnther Greindl
Department of Philosophy of Science
University of Vienna
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Received on Wed Apr 02 2008 - 14:22:14 PDT

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