Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

From: David Nyman <david.nyman.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Sat, 23 Jun 2007 23:54:12 +0100

On 23/06/07, Brent Meeker <meekerdb.domain.name.hidden> wrote:

BM: Changing the description would be analogous to changing the reference
frame or the names on a map.

DN: I agree.

BM: The two processes would still be parallel, not orthogonal.

DN: But the inference I draw from your points above is that there is only
one process that has causal relevance to the world of the computer, and that
is the hardware one. It is 'distinguished' in virtue of emerging at the
same level as the computer and the causal network in which it is embedded.
The world of the program is 'imaginary', or 'orthogonal', from this
perspective - a ghost in the machine. It is 'parallel' only in the mind of
the programmer.

David


David Nyman wrote:
> > On 23/06/07, *Brent Meeker* <meekerdb.domain.name.hidden
> > <mailto:meekerdb.domain.name.hidden>> wrote:
> >
> > BM: But he could also switch from an account in terms of the machine
> > level causality to an account in terms of the computed 'world'. In fact
> > he could switch back and forth. Causality in the computed 'world' would
> > have it's corresponding causality in the machine and vice versa. So I
> > don't see why they should be regarded as "orthogonal".
> >
> > DN: Because the 'computational' description is arbitrary with respect
> > to the behaviour of the hardware. It's merely an imputation, one of an
> > infinite set of such descriptions that could be imputed to the same
> > hardware behaviour.
>
> True. But whatever interpretation was placed on the hardware behavior it
> would still have the same causal relations in it as the hardware. Although
> there will be infinitely many possible interpretations, it's not the case
> that any description will do. Changing the description would be analogous
> to changing the reference frame or the names on a map. The two processes
> would still be parallel, not orthogonal.
>
> Brent Meeker
>
> >
>

--~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list.domain.name.hidden
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list-unsubscribe.domain.name.hidden
For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
Received on Sat Jun 23 2007 - 18:54:25 PDT

This archive was generated by hypermail 2.3.0 : Fri Feb 16 2018 - 13:20:14 PST