Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

From: Brent Meeker <meekerdb.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Sat, 23 Jun 2007 11:19:26 -0700

David Nyman wrote:
> On 23/06/07, *Brent Meeker* <meekerdb.domain.name.hidden
> <mailto:meekerdb.domain.name.hidden>> wrote:
>
> BM: But he could also switch from an account in terms of the machine
> level causality to an account in terms of the computed 'world'. In fact
> he could switch back and forth. Causality in the computed 'world' would
> have it's corresponding causality in the machine and vice versa. So I
> don't see why they should be regarded as "orthogonal".
>
> DN: Because the 'computational' description is arbitrary with respect
> to the behaviour of the hardware. It's merely an imputation, one of an
> infinite set of such descriptions that could be imputed to the same
> hardware behaviour.

True. But whatever interpretation was placed on the hardware behavior it would still have the same causal relations in it as the hardware. Although there will be infinitely many possible interpretations, it's not the case that any description will do. Changing the description would be analogous to changing the reference frame or the names on a map. The two processes would still be parallel, not orthogonal.

Brent Meeker

--~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list.domain.name.hidden
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list-unsubscribe.domain.name.hidden
For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
Received on Sat Jun 23 2007 - 14:19:51 PDT

This archive was generated by hypermail 2.3.0 : Fri Feb 16 2018 - 13:20:14 PST