On Jun 21, 8:24 pm, Brent Meeker <meeke....domain.name.hidden> wrote:
> Sounds like the sign is already up and it reads, "Participatorily intuit the magic of the de-formalized ding an sich."
I'd be happy with that sign, if you substituted a phrase like 'way of
being' for 'magic'. There is no analogy between the two cases, because
Russell seeks to pull the entire 1-person rabbit, complete with 'way
of being', out of a hat that contains only 3-person formalisations.
This is magic with a vengeance. The ding an sich (and, although I mis-
attributed monads to him, Kant knew a 'thing' or two) is what we all
participate in, whether you intuit it or not. And my hat and my
rabbit, whether 0, 1, or 3-person versions, are participatory all the
way down.
> So a hydrogen atom has a 1st-person world view, but this is more than it's > physical interactions (which are merely part of it's formal description)?
>
> Maybe so - but my intuition doesn't tell me anything about it.
Clearly not. But your sometime way with (dis)analogy leads me to
mistrust your intuition in this case. Firstly, we're dealing with a
*reductive* account, so '1-person world view' in the case of a 'de-
formalised' hydrogen atom must be 'reduced' correspondingly. Such a
beastie neither sees nor hears, neither does it dream nor plan. But
then, it's 'formalised' counterpart isn't 'wet' either. But the
*behaviour* of such counterparts is standardly attested as a 'reduced'
component of 3-person accounts of the 'emergence' of 'liquidity'.
Analogously (and this really *is* analogous) the de-formalised
participant ('DFP') referenced by 'hydrogen atom' is a 'reduced'
component of a participative account of the emergence Russell's 1-
person world. But it's merely daft to suppose that its 'way of being'
entails a 1-person 'mini sensorium', because it manifestly lacks any
'machinery' to render this. Its humble role is to be a *component* in
*just* that 'machinery' that renders *Russell's* 1-person world.
DFPs aren't just the 'medium' of 1-person accounts, but that of *all*
accounts: 0, 1, or 3-person. All accounts are 'DFP-
instantiated' (whatever else?). The one you're presently viewing is
instantiated in the medium of DFPs variously corresponding to
'brains', 'computers', 'networks' etc. A 3-person account is just a
'formal take' on 'DFP reality'; a 1-person account is a 'personal
take'; and a 0-person account is a 'de-personalised take'.
David
> David Nyman wrote:
> > On Jun 19, 12:31 pm, Russell Standish <l....domain.name.hidden> wrote:
>
> >> Interaction is in terms of fields - electromagnetic for most of our
> >> everyday examples. The fields themselves are emergent effects from
> >> virtual boson exchange. Now how is this related to sensing exactly?
> >> (Other than sensing being a particular subclass of interaction)
>
> > Please, spare me the physico-mathematical imperialism! You say
> > "interaction is in terms of fields'". I think what you might claim
> > more modestly is something like "there is a mathematical formalism in
> > which interaction is modelled in terms of 'fields'". Fair enough. But
> > implicitly the formalism is a projection from (and reference to) a
> > *participatory* actuality which isn't simply 'mathematical' (pace
> > Bruno - and anyway, not in the sense he deploys it for the purposes of
> > COMP). And I'm not of course imputing 'sensing' to the formalism, but
> > to the 'de-formalised participants' from which it is projected.
>
> > 'Participatory' here means that you must situate yourself at the point
> > of reference of your formalism, and intuit that 'thou-art-that' from
> > which the projection originates. If you do this, does the term
> > 'sensing' still seem so 'soft'? The formalisms are projections from
> > the participatory semantics of a 'modulated continuum' that embraces
> > you, me and everything we know. When you situate yourself here, do
> > you really not 'get' the intuitive self-relation between continuum and
> > modulation? Even when you know that Russell's 1-person world - an
> > 'emergent' from this - indeed self-relates in both sense and action?
> > If not, then as Colin is arguing, you'd have to erect a sign with
> > 'then magic happens' between 'emergent' and 'reductive' accounts.
>
> Sounds like the sign is already up and it reads, "Participatorily intuit the magic of the de-formalized ding an sich."
>
>
>
>
>
> >> Sensing to me implies some
> >> form of agency at one end of the interaction. I don't attribute any sort
> >> of agency to the interaction between two hydrogen atoms making up
> >> a hydrogen molecule for instance.
>
> > Same illustration. 'Hydrogen atoms' are again just projective
> > formalisms to which of course nobody would impute 'agency'. But
> > situate yourself where I suggest, and intuit the actions of any 'de-
> > formalised participants' referenced by the term 'hydrogen atoms' that
> > are implicated in Russell's 1-person world. From this perspective,
> > any 'agency' that Russell displays is indeed inherent in such lower-
> > level 'entities' in 'reduced' form. This is a perfectly standard
> > aspect of any 'reductive-emergent' scheme. For some reason you seem
> > prepared to grant it in a 3-person account, but not in a participatory
> > one.
>
> > The customary 'liquidity' and 'life' counter-arguments are simply
> > misconceived here, because these attributions emerge from, and hence
> > are applicable to, formal descriptions, independent of their 'de-
> > formalised' participatory referents. But you can't apply the
> > semantics of 'sensing' and 'agency' in the same way, because these are
> > ineluctably participatory, and are coherent only when intuited as such
> > 'all the way down' (e.g. as attributes of 1-person worlds and the
> > participatory 'sense-action' hierarchies on which they supervene).
>
> So a hydrogen atom has a 1st-person world view, but this is more than it's physical interactions (which are merely part of it's formal description)?
>
> Maybe so - but my intuition doesn't tell me anything about it.
>
> Brent Meeker
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Received on Thu Jun 21 2007 - 16:45:05 PDT