Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

From: John Mikes <jamikes.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Thu, 21 Jun 2007 15:42:48 -0400

David wrote: < everything-list.domain.name.hidden>
Jun 21, 2007 2:31 PM



David, you are still too mild IMO. You wrote:
"... "there is a mathematical formalism in which interaction is modelled in
terms of 'fields'".
I would say: we call 'fields' what seems to be callable 'interaction' upon
the outcome of certain mathematical transformations - or something similar.
The similarity of math formulas does not justify implication of some
"physical reality" - whatever that may mean.
What 'SPINS'? What undulates into Waves? Russell's "... emergent effects
from virtual boson exchange. ..." are indeed virtually (imaginary?) emergent
VIRTUAL effects from a virtual exchange of virtual bosons. I agree: that
would not match your "Fair enough".
I like your quest for "de-formalized participants" (like e.g. energy?)

H and other atoms are ingenius representatives serving explanation for
things observed scimpily in ages of epistemic insufficiency by
'age'-adjusted instrumentation.
And with new epistemic enrichment science does not 'reconsider' what was
'believed', but modifies it to maintain the 'earlier' adjusted to the later
information (e.g. entropy in its 15th or so variation). Molecules were
rod-connected atom-figments, then turned into electric connections, then
secondary attraction-agglomerates, more functional than were the orig.
primitive bindings. It still does not fit for biology, this embryonic state
limited model- science as applied for the elusive "life" processes.

Something happens and we 'think' what. Those ingenius(ly applied) math
equations based on previous cut-model quantization (disregarding the
influence of the 'beyond model' total
world) are 'matched' by constants, new math, or even for such purpose
invented concepts which, however, in the 274th consecutive application are
considered "facts".
The 'matches' are considered WITHIN the aspects included into the model,
other aspect unmatches form 'paradoxes', or necessitate axioms. "MY"
synthesized macromolecules(?) were successfully applicable in practical
technology - in the same realm they were made for. The mass of an electron
matches miraculously to other results within the same wing of the edifice of
scientific branch.

And how about your mentioned 'agency'? it is all figured in our human
patterns, what and how WE should do to get to an effect (maybe poorly
observed!). Nature does not have to follow our logic or mechanism. We know
only a part of it, understand it by our logic, make it pars pro toto and
describe nature in our actual human ways.
That is conventional science in which I made a good living, successful
practical results, publications and reputation in my branch. Then I started
to think.
We live on misconceptions and a "new" paradigm is still in those.

It is always a joy to read your posts.

John




On 6/21/07, David Nyman < david.nyman.domain.name.hidden > wrote:
>
>
> On Jun 19, 12:31 pm, Russell Standish < l....domain.name.hidden> wrote:
>
> > Interaction is in terms of fields - electromagnetic for most of our
> > everyday examples. The fields themselves are emergent effects from
> > virtual boson exchange. Now how is this related to sensing exactly?
> > (Other than sensing being a particular subclass of interaction)
>
> Please, spare me the physico-mathematical imperialism! You say
> "interaction is in terms of fields'". I think what you might claim
> more modestly is something like "there is a mathematical formalism in
> which interaction is modelled in terms of 'fields'". Fair enough. But
> implicitly the formalism is a projection from (and reference to) a
> *participatory* actuality which isn't simply 'mathematical' (pace
> Bruno - and anyway, not in the sense he deploys it for the purposes of
> COMP). And I'm not of course imputing 'sensing' to the formalism, but
> to the 'de-formalised participants' from which it is projected.
>
> 'Participatory' here means that you must situate yourself at the point
> of reference of your formalism, and intuit that 'thou-art-that' from
> which the projection originates. If you do this, does the term
> 'sensing' still seem so 'soft'? The formalisms are projections from
> the participatory semantics of a 'modulated continuum' that embraces
> you, me and everything we know. When you situate yourself here, do
> you really not 'get' the intuitive self-relation between continuum and
> modulation? Even when you know that Russell's 1-person world - an
> 'emergent' from this - indeed self-relates in both sense and action?
> If not, then as Colin is arguing, you'd have to erect a sign with
> 'then magic happens' between 'emergent' and 'reductive' accounts.
>
> > Sensing to me implies some
> > form of agency at one end of the interaction. I don't attribute any sort
> > of agency to the interaction between two hydrogen atoms making up
> > a hydrogen molecule for instance.
>
> Same illustration. 'Hydrogen atoms' are again just projective
> formalisms to which of course nobody would impute 'agency'. But
> situate yourself where I suggest, and intuit the actions of any 'de-
> formalised participants' referenced by the term 'hydrogen atoms' that
> are implicated in Russell's 1-person world. From this perspective,
> any 'agency' that Russell displays is indeed inherent in such lower-
> level 'entities' in 'reduced' form. This is a perfectly standard
> aspect of any 'reductive-emergent' scheme. For some reason you seem
> prepared to grant it in a 3-person account, but not in a participatory
> one.
>
> The customary 'liquidity' and 'life' counter-arguments are simply
> misconceived here, because these attributions emerge from, and hence
> are applicable to, formal descriptions, independent of their 'de-
> formalised' participatory referents. But you can't apply the
> semantics of 'sensing' and 'agency' in the same way, because these are
> ineluctably participatory, and are coherent only when intuited as such
> 'all the way down' (e.g. as attributes of 1-person worlds and the
> participatory 'sense-action' hierarchies on which they supervene).
>
> David
>
> > On Tue, Jun 19, 2007 at 09:40:59AM -0000, David Nyman wrote:
> >
> > > On Jun 19, 5:09 am, Russell Standish <l....domain.name.hidden> wrote:
> >
> > > > David, I was unable to perceive a question in what you just wrote. I
>
> > > > haven't a response, since (sadly) I was unable to understand what
> you
> > > > were talking about. :(
> >
> > > Really? I'm surprised, but words can indeed be very slippery in this
> > > context. Oh, well. To condense: my argument is intended to pump the
> > > intuition that a 'primitive' (or 'reduced') notion of 'sensing' (or
> > > please substitute anything that carries the thrust of 'able to
> > > locate', 'knows it's there', etc.) is already inescapably present in
> > > the notion of 'interaction' between fundamental 'entities' in any
> > > feasible model of reality. Else, how could we claim that they retain
> > > any coherent sense of being 'in contact'?
> >
> > Interaction is in terms of fields - electromagnetic for most of our
> > everyday examples. The fields themselves are emergent effects from
> > virtual boson exchange. Now how is this related to sensing exactly?
> > (Other than sensing being a particular subclass of interaction)
> >
> > ...
> >
> > > implications. So my question is, do you think it has any merit, or is
>
> > > simply wrong, indeterminate, or gibberish? And why?
> >
> > If I have to pick an answer: gibberish. Sensing to me implies some
> > form of agency at one end of the interaction. I don't attribute any sort
>
> > of agency to the interaction between two hydrogen atoms making up a
> > hydrogen molecule for instance.
> >
> > --
> >
> >
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> > A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
> > Mathematics
> > UNSW SYDNEY 2052 hpco....domain.name.hidden
> > Australia http://www.hpcoders.com.au
> >
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
>
>
> >
>

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Received on Thu Jun 21 2007 - 15:43:04 PDT

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