Re: Asifism

From: Jef Allbright <jef.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Fri, 8 Jun 2007 09:39:46 -0700

On 6/8/07, Torgny Tholerus <torgny.domain.name.hidden> wrote:
>
> Quentin Anciaux skrev:
> On Friday 08 June 2007 17:37:06 Torgny Tholerus wrote:
>
>
> What is the problem?
>
> If a computer behaves as if it knows anything, what is the problem with
> that? That type of behaviour increases the probability for the computer
> to survive, so the natural selection will favour that type of behaviour.
>
> I claim that if it behaves as if, then it means it has consciousness...
> Philosophical zombie (which is what it is all about) are not possible... If
> it is impossible to discern it with what we define as conscious (and when I
> say impossible, I mean there exists no test that can show between the
> presuposed zombie and a conscious being a difference of behavior) then there
> is no point whatsover you can say to prove that one is conscious and one is
> not. Either both are conscious or both aren't... While you say you're not
> conscious... I am, therefore you're conscious.
>
> The question, as I see it, is if there is anything "more" than just atoms
> reacting with each other in our brains. I claim that there is not anything
> "more". The atoms reacting with each other explain fully my (and your...)
> behaviour. Our brains are very complicated structures, but it is nothing
> supernatural with them. Physics explains everything.

While I would point out that physics cannot possibly explain
everything, being a necessarily constrained subjective model of
"reality", I would like to reinforce the point about "consciousness."
Consciousness certainly exists, as a description relating a set of
observations having to do with subjective awareness, but there is
nothing requiring that we assign it the status of an ontological
entity.

- Jef

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Received on Fri Jun 08 2007 - 12:39:59 PDT

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