Re: The Meaning of Life

From: Bruno Marchal <>
Date: Tue, 20 Mar 2007 15:58:47 +0100

Le 15-mars-07, à 17:15, David Nyman a écrit :

> Yes, in that it makes sense to argue (from a 'contingentist'
> perspective) that the justification for 'primeness' (or indeed any
> other concept) derives ultimately from persistent aspects of
> contingent states of affairs (in this case a degree of persistence we
> abstract as 'necessity'). So from this perspective 17 is
> 'necessarily' prime, but this very 'necessity' is limited to the
> contingent framework that supports the conceptual one. In this view,
> positing 'platonic primeness' does no further work. This is not to
> take issue with Bruno's alternative numerical basis for contingency,
> but rather to see it as just that - an alternative, not a knock-down
> argument.

Please, don't take what I will say here as an authoritative argument.
Giving the extreme newness, you have to understand this by yourself,
and the UDA is really a construction which aimed at that. But my point
is that once we assume the comp hyp in the cognitive science, then, the
reversal between "matter" and "mind" is not an alternative, it is a
You can still believe in "primary matter" if you want to, but you just
cannot use it to individuate neither mind/person, nor matter.
Of course, arithmetical truth as seen from inside is full of relative
contingies, generally treated by a modal diamond (having an
arithmetical interpretation).
For the UDA you need only a passive knowledge of Church thesis. For the
lob interview you need more background in mathematical logic and in
theoretical computer science.
And to believe it, I guess you have to know about the quantum, which is
currently still more weird than anything I extract from comp (but that
converges as it should).


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Received on Tue Mar 20 2007 - 11:04:55 PDT

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