Bruno and Brent:
Are we back at the "Aris-total" i.e. the "sum" considered "more" than its (material-only!) components? Complexity of an assemblage includes more than what a reductionist 'component-analysis' can verify. Qualia, functions, even out-of-boundary effects are active in identifying an item.
It is in our many centuries old explanatory ways to say
a proton and an electron make a H-atom and vice versa.
First off: hydrogen (gas) is not the assemblage of H-atoms, it is an observational item that - when destructed in certain ways - results in other observables resembling H-atoms or even protons and electrons (if you have the means to look at them - not in an n-th deduction and its calculations). Same with 'other' atoms - molecules, singularly or in bunch. Reduced to a 2-D sketch. Nice game, I spent 50 years producing such (macromolecules that is) and 'studied'/applied them. Of course none of the destruction-result carries the proper charactersitics of the original ensemble. And NO proper 'observation' does exist.
It is the explanatory attempt for a world(part?) - not understood, just regarded as a model of whatever our epistemic enrichment has provided to THAT time. This is the 'reducing': to visualize this part as the total and utter the Aristotelian maxim.
One can not extrapolate 'total ensemble' characteristics from studying the so called parts we discovered so far.
We can think only within our already acquired knowledge.
John M
----- Original Message -----
From: Brent Meeker
To: everything-list.domain.name.hidden
Sent: Thursday, March 15, 2007 2:30 PM
Subject: Re: Evidence for the simulation argument - and Thanks and a dumb question.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> Le 14-mars-07, à 04:42, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
>
> On 3/13/07, *Bruno Marchal* <marchal.domain.name.hidden> wrote:
>
> > You could say that a hydrogen atom cannot be reduced to an
> electron +
> > proton because it exhibits behaviour not exhibited in any of its
> > components;
>
>
> Nor by any juxtaposition of its components in case of some prior
> entanglement. In that case I can expect some bits of information from
> looking only the electron, and some bits from looking only the proton,
> but an observation of the whole atom would makes those bits not
> genuine. It is weird but the quantum facts confirms this QM prediction.
>
> Quantum weirdness is an observed fact. We assume that it is,
> somehow, an intrinsic property of subatomic particles; but perhaps
> there is a hidden factor or as yet undiscovered theory which may
> explain it further.
>
>
>
> That would be equivalent to adding hidden variables. But then they have
> to be non local (just to address the facts, not just the theory).
> Of course if the hidden factor is given by the "many worlds" or comp,
> then such non local effects has to be retrospectively expected. But then
> we have to forget the idea that substance (decomposable reality) exists,
> but numbers.
If you admit non-local hidden variables then you can have a theory like Bohmian quantum mechanics in which randomness is all epistemological, like statistical mechanics, and there is no place for multiple-worlds.
>
>
> You could get a neutron at high enough energies, I suppose, but I
> don't think that is what you mean. Is it possible to bring a proton
> and an electron appropriately together and have them just sit there
> next to each other?
>
>
> Locally yes.
I'm not sure what you mean by "locally". Since they have opposite charge they will be attracted by photon exchanges and will fall into some hydrogen atom state by emission of photons.
Brent Meeker
>In QM this is given by a tensor product of the
> corresponding states. But it is an exceptional state. With comp it is
> open if such "physical state" acn ever be prepared, even locally.
>
> There is no sense to say
> an atom is part of the UD. It is "part" of the necessary discourse of
> self-observing machine. Recall comp makes physics branch of machine's
> psychology/theology.
>
> Isn't that the *ultimate* reduction of everything?
>
>
> Given that a theology rarely eliminates subjects/person, I don't see in
> what reasonable sense this would be a reduction.
>
>
> Not really because the knot is a topological object. Its identity is
> defined by the class of equivalence for some topological transformation
> from your 3D description. If you put the knot in your pocket so that it
> changes its 3D shape (but is not broken) then it conserve its knot
> identity which is only locally equivalent with the 3D shape. To see the
> global equivalence will be tricky, and there is no algorithm telling
> for sure you can identify a knot from a 3D description.
> People can look here for a cute knot table:
> http://www.math.utoronto.ca/~drorbn/KAtlas/Knots/index.html
>
> I was thinking of a physical knot, which is not the same as the
> Platonic ideal, even if there is no such thing as a separate
> physical reality.
>
>
> I don't know what you mean by a physical knots.
A remark only a mathematician could make ;-)
I think Bruno just means a knot is defined by the topology of its embedding in space - not by its material or its coordinates; as a triangle is defined by having three sides, not any particular size, orientation, or material.
Brent Meeker
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Received on Thu Mar 15 2007 - 16:51:29 PDT