Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

From: Bruno Marchal <>
Date: Mon, 26 Feb 2007 15:25:48 +0100

Le 26-févr.-07, à 12:58, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :

> On 2/26/07, Bruno Marchal <> wrote:
>> Le 26-févr.-07, à 11:57, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
>> >
>> >
>> > On 2/26/07, John M <> wrote:
>> >>> From: Brent Meeker
>> >>> To:
>> >>> Sent: Saturday, February 24, 2007 5:35 PM
>> >>> Subject: Re: Evidence for the simulation argument
>> >>> (Brent wrote):
>> >>> "....The point is that the simulation doesn't have to simulate the
>> >>> whole complicated universe, only the part we can investigate and
>> >>> understand." -----(End of his post below)
>> >>>
>> >>> ---WE???WHO????---
>> >>>
>> >>> "We" as Einstein or Feinstein, or John Doe?
>> >>> or even Mbamba Kruit from the forests of New Guinea?
>> >>> Doesevery one of us simulate(!) (into?) his personalized universe
>> >>> with understandability levels PERSONALLY adjusted?
>> >>> (and why simulate?)
>> >>> JohnThe discussions so far seem to assume that as inhabitants of a
>> >>> possibly simulated world we have some reliable knowledge of what a
>> >>> "real" world would look like, so that we can gather scientific
>> data
>> >>> and thereby determine whether it is a sham. But it's unlikely that
>> >>> we are going to run into a Microsoft logo or bump their heads
>> >>> against a huge planetarium screen. How do we know that the limits
>> of
>> >>> the simulation we might be in are not represented by the speed of
>> >>> light or the granularity of matter/energy, both limits on how much
>> >>> we can possibly observe? Maybe in the "real" world the speed of
>> >>> light is much larger or infinite, or matter/energy is continuous
>> or
>> >>> more finely granular. How would we know?
>> >
>> > Stathis Papaioannou
>> Of course we cannot *know*.  But if we assume the comp Hypothesis,
>> then
>> we *can* "know" (relatively to the comp hyp).
>> Indeed, if comp is true, then we "belong" to all simulations of us
>> possible at once. All the simulations are generated by the DU. And the
>> physical appearances are (first person) sum on all relative
>> computations. And if "I" is different from "Universe/God", then comp
>> predicts "Universe/God", as it can appear to me or us, is NOT Turing
>> emulable. QM confirms this fact, but it is an open problem if comp
>> generates to too much white rabbit or not. If QM is the only
>> comp-physics possible, then indeed first and third person white
>> rabbits
>> would disappear.
>> Remember just this: if I am turing emulable then the observable
>> universe cannot be. This follows from UDA.
>> Cf my previews explanation:

>  The UDA is an argument about ultimate reality. We can still speculate
> as to whether we are simulated in one level relative to another level.

Locally, this makes sense. What UDA shows (I think Mark Peaty has the
right intuition here) is that if we are simulated at some relative
level, then we can know it (like in a lucid dream). If we are 100%
correctly simulated, this is equivalent as saying we are already
simulated by the UD, because if the simulation is physically correct,
then it makes no sense to attach our mind to just that simulation. We
are infinitely distributed in the whole UD* (static block-execution of
the UD). OK?
If the simulation is not correct, then we can know it, if it last
enough, and if there is no "malin genie" killing his creature each time
when they discover the fake nature of they neighborhood (like in
totalitarian system).

Must go. I am not sure when I can go back to my office this week.
Teaching duties.


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Received on Mon Feb 26 2007 - 09:26:30 PST

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