On 2/26/07, Bruno Marchal <marchal.domain.name.hidden> wrote:
> Le 26-févr.-07, à 11:57, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
>
> >
> >
> > On 2/26/07, John M <jamikes.domain.name.hidden> wrote:
> >>> From: Brent Meeker
> >>> To: everything-list.domain.name.hidden
> >>> Sent: Saturday, February 24, 2007 5:35 PM
> >>> Subject: Re: Evidence for the simulation argument
> >>> (Brent wrote):
> >>> "....The point is that the simulation doesn't have to simulate the
> >>> whole complicated universe, only the part we can investigate and
> >>> understand." -----(End of his post below)
> >>>
> >>> ---WE???WHO????---
> >>>
> >>> "We" as Einstein or Feinstein, or John Doe?
> >>> or even Mbamba Kruit from the forests of New Guinea?
> >>> Doesevery one of us simulate(!) (into?) his personalized universe
> >>> with understandability levels PERSONALLY adjusted?
> >>> (and why simulate?)
>
> >>> JohnThe discussions so far seem to assume that as inhabitants of a
> >>> possibly simulated world we have some reliable knowledge of what a
> >>> "real" world would look like, so that we can gather scientific data
> >>> and thereby determine whether it is a sham. But it's unlikely that
> >>> we are going to run into a Microsoft logo or bump their heads
> >>> against a huge planetarium screen. How do we know that the limits of
> >>> the simulation we might be in are not represented by the speed of
> >>> light or the granularity of matter/energy, both limits on how much
> >>> we can possibly observe? Maybe in the "real" world the speed of
> >>> light is much larger or infinite, or matter/energy is continuous or
> >>> more finely granular. How would we know?
> >
> > Stathis Papaioannou
>
>
>
>
> Of course we cannot *know*. But if we assume the comp Hypothesis, then
> we *can* "know" (relatively to the comp hyp).
> Indeed, if comp is true, then we "belong" to all simulations of us
> possible at once. All the simulations are generated by the DU. And the
> physical appearances are (first person) sum on all relative
> computations. And if "I" is different from "Universe/God", then comp
> predicts "Universe/God", as it can appear to me or us, is NOT Turing
> emulable. QM confirms this fact, but it is an open problem if comp
> generates to too much white rabbit or not. If QM is the only
> comp-physics possible, then indeed first and third person white rabbits
> would disappear.
> Remember just this: if I am turing emulable then the observable
> universe cannot be. This follows from UDA.
> Cf my previews explanation:
> http://www.mail-archive.com/everything-list.domain.name.hidden/msg05272.html
The UDA is an argument about ultimate reality. We can still speculate as to
whether we are simulated in one level relative to another level.
Stathis Papaioannou
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Received on Mon Feb 26 2007 - 07:01:14 PST