Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

From: Hal Ruhl <>
Date: Tue, 20 Feb 2007 22:49:40 -0500

Hi Bruno:

As to my grasp of the UDA I think I understood it at one time well
enough for my purpose but that will become clearer as I progress
through my model. There are not too many more steps.

Examining the complete list of possible properties of objects we
should find "Empty of all information".

This would on a sub list. It would from at least part of the sub
list that could be assigned the name "The Nothing" or just "Nothing".

The Nothing would also be incomplete if there was a meaningful
question it must answer. The question would be "Can The Nothing
sustain its of property of being empty of information?" It can not
answer this question so it is incomplete. However, it must answer
this question so its incompleteness is unstable. It must eventually
eat its way into the rest of the list so to speak - eventually having
an countably infinite number of properties. This is the source of my
model's dynamic.

The list itself has properties and these are on a sub list.

We actually do not need the list if we allow for simplicity that the
objects it and its sub lists define are themselves the sufficient
elements of the model. The list is then an object and contains
itself. It is infinitely nested. Each nesting has its unstably
incomplete Nothing. An infinite nesting of dynamic potential.

If the list is complete which seems certain then it should be [I
believe] inconsistent [will answer all questions all ways] which we
have touched on before. The inconsistency is inherited by the
dynamic so the dynamic has a random content.

All levels of randomness of trips to completeness are allowed.

A UD trace if I understand it correctly would be equivalent to a
Nothing on a reasonably monotonic trip to completeness.


Hal Ruhl

At 12:10 PM 2/20/2007, you wrote:

>Hi Hal,
>You say my theory is a subset of yours. I don't understand. I have no
>theory, just a deductive argument that IF we are (digital) machine then
>"the physical world" is in our head. Then I show how a Universal Turing
>Machine can discover it in its own "head". This makes comp, or
>variants, testable.
>I have no theory (beside theory of number and machine), I'm just
>listening to the machine. That's all. Then I compare the comp-physics
>with empirical physics.
>Do you grasp the Universal Dovetailer Argument? Ask if not.

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Received on Tue Feb 20 2007 - 22:50:16 PST

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