Hi Hal,
You say my theory is a subset of yours. I don't understand. I have no
theory, just a deductive argument that IF we are (digital) machine then
"the physical world" is in our head. Then I show how a Universal Turing
Machine can discover it in its own "head". This makes comp, or
variants, testable.
I have no theory (beside theory of number and machine), I'm just
listening to the machine. That's all. Then I compare the comp-physics
with empirical physics.
Do you grasp the Universal Dovetailer Argument? Ask if not.
Regards,
Bruno
Le 20-févr.-07, à 04:42, Hal Ruhl a écrit :
>
> Hi Bruno:
>
> At 05:43 AM 2/19/2007, you wrote:
>
>
>> Le 18-févr.-07, à 03:33, Hal Ruhl a écrit :
>>
>>>
>>> Hi Bruno:
>>>
>>> In response I will start with some assumptions central to my
>>> approach.
>>>
>>> The first has to do with the process of making a list.
>>>
>>> The assumption is:
>>>
>>> Making a list of items [which could be some of
>>> the elements of a set for example] is always a
>>> process of making a one to one mapping of the
>>> items to some of the counting numbers such as:
>>>
>>> 1 - an item
>>> 2 - an item not previously on the list
>>> 3 - an item not previously on the list
>>> .
>>> .
>>> .
>>> n - last item and it was not previously on the list
>>
>>
>> I don' t see clearly an assumption here. I guess you are assuming
>> existence of things capable of being put in a list.
>
> What I am trying to do is establish what making a
> list is in my model and does it have any mathematical credence.
>
> I make it an assumption because some may believe
> that "make a list" means something different.
>
>> Effectively? then
>> why not use the Wi (cf Cutland's book or older explanations I have
>> provided on the list. Help yourself with Podniek's page perhaps, or
>> try
>> to be just informal.
>>
>
> See below
>
>
>
>
>>>
>>> My second assumption is:
>>>
>>> Objects [such as states of universes for example] have properties.
>>
>>
>> You talk like if it was an axiomatic. A good test to see if it is an
>> axiomatic consists to change the primitive words you are using by
>> arbitrary words. You are saying "glass of bears have trees and
>> garden".
>
> Did you mean class not "glass"?
>
>> You can add that you mean that the term "glass of bear" is *intended
>> for states of universes,
>
> I am not a mathematician so I do not quite understand the above.
>
>> but recall the goal is to provide an
>> explanation for the appearance of the "states of universes".
>
> If I understand you, that comes later in the walk through of my model
>
>> In general
>> properties are modelized by sets. It is ok to presuppose some naive
>> set
>> theory, but then you "axiomatic" has to be clean.
>>
>
> See below
>
>
>
>>>
>>> My third assumption is:
>>>
>>> All of the properties it is possible for objects to have can be
>>> listed.
>>
>>
>> I guess you assume church thesis, and you are talking about effective
>> properties.
>>
>
> To me at this point the Church Thesis is an
> ingredient in some of the possible state
> succession sequences allowed in my model.
>
> I mean all properties I do not know if that is
> the same as your "effective" properties.
>
>
>>>
>>> My fourth assumption is:
>>>
>>> The list of possible properties of objects is countably infinite.
>>
>>
>> ? (lists are supposed to be countably infinite (or finite)).
>>
>
> This is my point above - "to list" inherently a
> countably infinite [as max length] process.
>
> I would add that my third assumption becomes more
> important later as one of the keys to my model's dynamic.
>
>
>
>>>
>>> Conclusions so far:
>>> [All possible objects are defined by all the sub lists of the full
>>> list.]
>>> [The number of objects is uncountably infinite]
>>
>> What is the full list?
>
> The list of all possible properties of objects.
>
>
>>>
>>> I will stop there for now and await comments.
>>>
>>> As to the remainder of the post:
>>>
>>> In the above I have not reached the point of
>>> deriving the dynamic of my model but I am not
>>> focusing on computations when I say that any
>>> succession of states is allowed. Logically
>>> related successions are allowed. Successions
>>> displaying any degree of randomness are also allowed.
>>
>>
>> I have already mentionned that comp entails some strong form of (first
>> person) randomness. Indeed, a priori to much.
>>
>
> Yes we have discussed this before, and it is one
> of the reasons I continue to believe that your approach is a sub set
> of mine.
>
> I know it has taken a long time for me to reach a
> level in my model where I could even begin to use
> an axiom based description and I appreciate your patience.
>
>>>
>>> I would like to finish the walk through of my
>>> model before discussing white rabbits and observation.
>>
>>
>> I am really sorry Hall. It looks you want to be both informal and
>> formal. It does not help me to understand what you are trying to say.
>
> I have read that it takes 10 years of focused
> practice to become an expert in a given sub discipline.
>
> At this point in my practice of engineering I am
> on my way to becoming an expert in a fifth sub discipline.
>
> I hope you can understand why I must continue to
> find a path to the development and expression of
> my ideas in this venue that is short of becoming
> an expert in mathematical expression.
>
> I appreciate your help and perhaps with a little
> more of it I can reach what you are asking for.
>
> Perhaps it is also a good idea to exhaust the
> idea of whether or not your approach is or is not
> a sub set of another approach.
>
> Yours
>
> Hal Ruhl
>
>
>
>
>
> >
>
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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Received on Tue Feb 20 2007 - 14:31:33 PST