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From: <hal.domain.name.hidden>

Date: Thu, 21 Oct 1999 09:18:47 -0700

Why can't the simplest possible program be taken as computing a universe

which includes us? We tend to say "it computes all universes" as though

it computes more than one. Then it is fair to object that the program

is too simple, because it computes more than one universe.

But this is a semantic objection based on the definition of a universe.

How do we know how many universes a given program computes? Is there

an objective, well defined measure? That seems necessary in order to

rule out a trivial counting or dovetailing program as one which creates

our observable universe and our minds as a subset of its output.

Wei Dai proposed a solution to this, which was to say that it is not

enough to compute a universe that matches what I see; it must compute

a universe which includes my mind. And then, he proposes that the

probability measure should not be calculated as just the size of the

universe program, but rather as the size of the program that computes

the universe PLUS the size of the program that localizes (finds, locates)

my mind within that universe.

This provides an objective measure of the degree of

overkill/redundancy/extra-universes produced by the universe simulation.

Something objective like this seems necessary to reject the notion that

we live in a universe produced by a trivial program.

Hal Finney

juergen.domain.name.hidden (Juergen Schmidhuber) writes:

*> Ah! The point is: the information content of a particular universe U is
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*> the length of the shortest algorithm that computes U AND NOTHING ELSE.
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*> But the shortest algorithm for everything computes all the other universes
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*> too. Hence it does not convey the information about U by itself!
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*>
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*> Everything conveys much less info than most particular computable
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*> objects. More is less. But to calculate the probability of a particular
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*> universe you need to look at its particular algorithms, of course, not
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*> at the collective probability of all universes.
*

Received on Thu Oct 21 1999 - 09:23:10 PDT

Date: Thu, 21 Oct 1999 09:18:47 -0700

Why can't the simplest possible program be taken as computing a universe

which includes us? We tend to say "it computes all universes" as though

it computes more than one. Then it is fair to object that the program

is too simple, because it computes more than one universe.

But this is a semantic objection based on the definition of a universe.

How do we know how many universes a given program computes? Is there

an objective, well defined measure? That seems necessary in order to

rule out a trivial counting or dovetailing program as one which creates

our observable universe and our minds as a subset of its output.

Wei Dai proposed a solution to this, which was to say that it is not

enough to compute a universe that matches what I see; it must compute

a universe which includes my mind. And then, he proposes that the

probability measure should not be calculated as just the size of the

universe program, but rather as the size of the program that computes

the universe PLUS the size of the program that localizes (finds, locates)

my mind within that universe.

This provides an objective measure of the degree of

overkill/redundancy/extra-universes produced by the universe simulation.

Something objective like this seems necessary to reject the notion that

we live in a universe produced by a trivial program.

Hal Finney

juergen.domain.name.hidden (Juergen Schmidhuber) writes:

Received on Thu Oct 21 1999 - 09:23:10 PDT

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