# RE: ASSA and Many-Worlds

From: Stathis Papaioannou <stathispapaioannou.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2007 09:49:00 +1100

Bruno Marchal writes:

> Le 28-janv.-07, à 20:21, Brent Meeker a écrit :>> > OK, but that means "observer moments" are not fundamental and the > > "illusion" of their continuity may be provided by the continuity of > > their underpinning. But I don't see how a strictly stepwise discrete > > process as contemplated in the UD can provide that continuity. It was > > my understanding that it assumed consciousness could be provided by a > > series of disjoint states.> > Yes. But a series of discrete states (or their godel number) has to be > related by a computation for making sense.> > So it makes no sense to say that a sequence of number is a computation. > You have to fix a "universal environment". Let us fix once and for all > a godel numbering. Then it is only relative to some universal number > that a sequence of number can be counted as a computation.
This sounds a bit strange, as if you have the sequence of numbers, then you set their meaning, and thereby create the computation. How can you "fix once and for all a Godel numbering" in Platonia? How do you exclude all the other possible interpretations?
> Now, from a first person point of view, we don't know in which > computation we belong. So from a first person point of view, we have to > take all equivalent computations (number sequence) relative to all > universal number.> > This is enough to explain why from first person points of view, > computations seem to require a continuum. In a sense we have to be > related to the continuum of computations going through our states (it > includes the infinity of computations describing finer grained > histories with respect to our comp level of substitution.> > Consciousness is typically a first person notion. Strictly speaking it > cannot be associated to one third person computation. Only this one can > be described by a sequence of discrete states (more or less arbitrarily > from a choice of a universal number/system). First person consciousness > is associated with a uncountable ("continuous") third person > computation.> > That is why all notion of self-correctness can make sense only > relatively to the most *probable* computational histories. OK?> > > Bruno> > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/> > > _________________________________________________________________