Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Brent Meeker writes:
>
> > Date: Sun, 28 Jan 2007 21:57:15 -0800
> > From: meekerdb.domain.name.hidden
> > To: everything-list.domain.name.hidden
> > Subject: Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds
> >
> >
> > Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > > Brent Meeker writes:
> > >
> > > > > > OK, but that means "observer moments" are not fundamental and the
> > > > > "illusion" of their continuity may be provided by the continuity of
> > > > > their underpinning. But I don't see how a strictly stepwise
> discrete
> > > > > process as contemplated in the UD can provide that continuity. It
> > > was my
> > > > > understanding that it assumed consciousness could be provided by a
> > > > > series of disjoint states.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Brent Meeker
> > > > >
> > > > > It's an assumption of computationalism that the discrete
> computational
> > > > > steps will lead to continuity of consciousness. Moreover, it's an
> > > > > assumption of computationalism that a discontinuity in substrate of
> > > > > implementation (i.e. from brain to digital computer) will preserve
> > > > > continuity of consciousness.
> > > >
> > > > Maybe that assumption is inconsistent.
> > > >
> > > > Computational steps have an order in Platonia. In implementing them
> > > in the material world, as in a computer, the sequentiallity (is that a
> > > word?) of the steps is provided by the underlying physics just as
> the 1s
> > > and 0s are provided by switches. But without the continuity of the
> > > substrate it seems the states need some axiomatic, inherent order
> as in
> > > Platonia. So then it is not clear that states can be chopped
> arbitrarily
> > > finely and still function as computations - or a stream of
> conscious states.
> > > >
> > > > Brent Meeker
> > >
> > > I don't see how it is possible to mix up something any more thoroughly
> > > in the real world than it is already mixed up in Platonia.
> >
> > Sure. In the real world I can write 1 2 4 7 6 3... But in arithmtic
> Platonia (a small part of the kingdom) there's no spacial or temporal
> order that can conflict with the inherent order.
>
> But "1 2 4 7 6 3..." is a string in Platonia, always "there" even if you
> don't explicitly state it (as you must do in the real world), and it
> doesn't manage to confuse the order of the counting numbers.
>
> > >It's not as
> > > if God has to explicitly put the integers in line one after the other:
> > > they just naturally form a sequence, and they would no less form a
> > > sequence if they were written on cards and thrown to the wind.
> Explicit
> > > ordering in the physical world is important from a third person
> > > perspective. If the putative sequence has a first person
> experience, and
> > > the substrate of its implementation is transparent to that first
> person
> > > experience (eg. an entity in a virtual reality environment with no
> > > external input) then the implicit ordering in Platonia is
> sufficient to
> > > create the first person impression of continuity.
> > >
> > > Stathis Papaioannou
> >
> > I don't disagree with that. But that means that a conscious, 1st
> person, pair of experiences, i.e. pair of numbers can have no order
> other than the inherent order of the numbers. And if an experience
> corresponds to just a number, then experiences are discrete and can't be
> chopped finer than some limit.
>
> The order of a pair of experiences is set by the fact that one is
> considered first and the other second, perhaps because there is a
> subjective sense of the passage of time, perhaps because the second
> experience contains a memory of the first, perhaps due to some other
> subtle aspect of the content of the experiences.
But on this view an experience is a complex thing, far from the atomic perception of a red flash, and even includes parts that are not conscious. This comports with my speculation that a conscious atom is fairly complex and has a significant duration such that it overlaps the conscious atoms before and after. This overlap provides the ordering and the sense of time and continuity.
> In the real world, the
> subjective content reflects brain activity which in turn reflects
> environmental input (that's why the sense of order evolved in the first
> place), but this relationship is only a contingent one.
Well that's the question isn't it. Comp assumes it, but comp also leads to strange if not absurd conclusions.
> If the pair of
> experiences are experienced in the order AB there is no way for the
> experiencer to know whether they were actually generated in the order AB
> or BA, unless reversing the order changes the content in some
> significant way.
That assumes the experiences can be discretely separated with not overlap. Certainly there are instances like that: the experience just before you lose consciousness due to a concussion and the experience just as you regain it are disjoint in this way. You only recover continuity through accessing memories and there is a gap even in that memory. But in ordinary circumstances the continuity might be inherent in the overlap of conscious atoms.
> This means there is no natural order of physical states (or abstract
> machine states): the order can be anything, and the subjective order of
> experience will be unchanged. It also means there is no natural order of
> subjective states: that which seems first, seems first and that which
> seems second, seems second. This is good, because it doesn't depend on
> any theory or assumption about consciousness.
No natural order of physical states? Are you denying causality?
> > I guess I need a more explicit idea of how experiences occur in
> arithmetic Platonia. Are we to imagine that some large number
> 3875835442... is a single, atomic experience and another number
> 3876976342... is another single, atomic experience and they have no
> other relation than their natural order? In that case, they would be
> experiences in a certain bundle of streams of consciousness just in
> virtue of having some digits in common or having factors in common or
> what? Or are we to imagine another Platonic object, a Turing machine,
> that generates both these numbers in a certain sequence (maybe the
> reverse of their natural order) - and that's what makes them parts of
> the same experience bundle?
> >
> > Brent Meeker
>
> I would say that the relationship between abstract machine states does
> not have anything to do with how mental states are ordered or even if
> they belong to the same person, except insofar as related machine states
> may lead to mental states with related content.
That's the question I was intending to raise. If comp is true then a computation may instantiate some consciousness, i.e. associates a number and a conscious state in one model anyway. Are these states ordered by inherent properties of the numbers? Or are they ordered by their order of generation by the machine? I think you favor the former; that states of consciousness exist timelessly in Platonia. But each one is so complex that there is an inherent ordering, as though each one contained pointers to successors and/or predecessors. I can understand that, but seems to me make conscious states much more complex than "observer moments" and to include much that is not conscious.
Brent Meeker
Brent Meeker
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Received on Mon Jan 29 2007 - 12:08:55 PST