RE: ASSA and Many-Worlds

From: Stathis Papaioannou <>
Date: Sat, 27 Jan 2007 15:49:02 +1100

Moreover, even if we constrain the definition of computer to include only the operations of factory-made devices plugged in and appropriately programmed, the fact that a digital computation at any instant does not access all of memory and data allows for the computation to be distributed over multiple machines in a network which accidentally have the appropriate configuration for that part of the computation. The only requirement is that the network be large enough in space and time to provide these configurations: from its point of view, the computation cannot be aware that the various steps of its implementation are disjointed and not causally connnected.Stathis PapaioannouFrom: RE: ASSA and Many-WorldsDate: Sat, 27 Jan 2007 14:41:07 +1100

Brent Meeker writes:> > > I think Bruno already remarked that it may well be more probable that > > a continuation of your consciousness arises in some other branch of the > > multiverse "by chance", rather than as a state of "your" erstwhile body. > > This would seem particularly more probable as your consciousness > > simplifies due to deterioration of your brain - how hard can it be to > > find a continuation of a near coma. Perhaps this continuation is the > > consciousness of a fish - and it's the Hindus rather than the Bhuddists > > who are right.> > > > Then we come up against the question of what we can expect to experience > > in the case of duplication with partial memory loss. For example, if you > > are duplicated 101 times such that one copy has 100% of your memories > > while the other 100 copies each have 1% of your memories, does this mean > > that you have an even chance of ending up as either the 100% or the 1% > > version of yourself? We need not invoke duplication experiments or the > > MWI to ask this question either. Suppose there are a billion people in > > the world each with 1/billion of my memories: does this mean I will find > > myself becoming one of these people either now or after I have died?> > As I understand it, Bruno's theory is that you are all the "consistent continuations" of your consciousness. I'm not exactly sure what constitutes a consistent continuation, but it must be something other than just sharing memories. At any given time my consciousness is accessing only a tiny fraction of my memories. Further I'm continually forming and forgetting short-term memories as well as forgetting some long-term memories. > > Basing identity on memory seems inconsistent with supposing that identity is some property of consciousness alone. A digital computation doesn't depend on memory/data that isn't accessed. Identity from moment to moment is not just memory, it is the entire content of conscious experience, perhaps accessing at any one time only a small portion of memory. It may be just a sense that I am the same person continuing the same thought as I was a moment ago, or even less than this when I am waking up from sleep, for example. At such sufficiently vague moments, my consciousness may even be indistinguishable with that of many other people in the world, such that if I ceased to exist momentarily I would still experience continuity of consciousness as if nothing had happened, piggy-backing on someone else's thoughts: all equivalent observer moments are internally indistinguishable, by definition. However, such a thing could only happen momentarily, because very quickly I might reflect on my situation, and it is here that having a store of memories, motivations, personality style etc. instantly accessible (even if not continuously accessed) makes me, me.Stathis Papaioannou Live Search: Better results, fast Try it now!

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Received on Fri Jan 26 2007 - 23:49:20 PST

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