Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Brent Meeker writes:
>
> > Date: Thu, 25 Jan 2007 17:00:11 -0800
> > From: meekerdb.domain.name.hidden
> > To: everything-list.domain.name.hidden
> > Subject: Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds
> >
> >
> > Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > >
> > > Johnathan Corgan writes:
> > >
> > >> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > >>
> > >>> If some multiverse theory happens to be true then by your way of
> argument we
> > >>> should all be extremely anxious all the time, because every
> moment terrible things
> > >>> are definitely happening to some copy of us. For example, we
> should be constantly
> > >>> be worrying that we will be struck by lightning, because we
> *will* be struck by lightning.
> > >> If MWI is true, *and* there isn't a lowest quantum of
> > >> probability/measure as Brent Meeker speculates, there is an
> interesting
> > >> corollary to the quantum theory of immortality.
> > >>
> > >> While one branch always exists which continues our consciousness
> > >> forward, indeed we are constantly "shedding" branches where the most
> > >> brutal and horrific things happen to us and result in our death. Their
> > >> measure is extremely small, so from a subjectively probability
> > >> perspective, we don't worry about them.
> > >>
> > >> I'd speculate that there are far more logically possible ways to
> > >> experience an agonizing, lingering death than to live. Some have a
> > >> relatively high measure, like getting hit by a car, or getting lung
> > >> cancer (if you're a smoker), so we take steps to avoid these (though
> > >> they still happen in some branch.) Others, like having all our
> > >> particles spontaneously quantum tunnel into the heart of a burning
> > >> furnace, are so low in measure, we can blissfully ignore the
> > >> possibility. Yet if MWI is true, there is some branch where this has
> > >> just happened to us. (modulo Brent's probability quantum.)
> > >>
> > >> If there are many more ways to die than to live, even of low
> individual
> > >> measure, I wonder how the "integral of the measure" across all of them
> > >> comes out.
> > >
> > > It's not death that is the problem (you always get out of that),
> it's suffering. Final death
> > > would be better than a living hell, but QTI denies you final death.
> I take comfort in the
> > > speculation that if I'm still alive in a few hundred years, most
> likely this will be as a result
> > > of some advanced medical or cybernetic intervention, and if science
> understands the brain
> > > well enough to do that, it would be a relatively simple matter by
> comparison to ensure that I
> > > am content. I think the hellish routes to immortality would occur
> mostly by chance and would
> > > be of much lower total measure than the deliberate, happy routes.
> >
> > I think Bruno already remarked that it may well be more probable that
> a continuation of your consciousness arises in some other branch of the
> multiverse "by chance", rather than as a state of "your" erstwhile body.
> This would seem particularly more probable as your consciousness
> simplifies due to deterioration of your brain - how hard can it be to
> find a continuation of a near coma. Perhaps this continuation is the
> consciousness of a fish - and it's the Hindus rather than the Bhuddists
> who are right.
>
> Then we come up against the question of what we can expect to experience
> in the case of duplication with partial memory loss. For example, if you
> are duplicated 101 times such that one copy has 100% of your memories
> while the other 100 copies each have 1% of your memories, does this mean
> that you have an even chance of ending up as either the 100% or the 1%
> version of yourself? We need not invoke duplication experiments or the
> MWI to ask this question either. Suppose there are a billion people in
> the world each with 1/billion of my memories: does this mean I will find
> myself becoming one of these people either now or after I have died?
As I understand it, Bruno's theory is that you are all the "consistent continuations" of your consciousness. I'm not exactly sure what constitutes a consistent continuation, but it must be something other than just sharing memories. At any given time my consciousness is accessing only a tiny fraction of my memories. Further I'm continually forming and forgetting short-term memories as well as forgetting some long-term memories.
Basing identity on memory seems inconsistent with supposing that identity is some property of consciousness alone. A digital computation doesn't depend on memory/data that isn't accessed.
Brent Meeker
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Received on Fri Jan 26 2007 - 11:32:41 PST