RE: ASSA and Many-Worlds

From: Stathis Papaioannou <>
Date: Sun, 21 Jan 2007 15:45:23 +1100

Wiliam writes:

> Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> > Hi,
> >
> > Le Vendredi 19 Janvier 2007 12:20, William a écrit :
> > > I have been reading up on this subject a little bit and about the
> > > quantum immortality, I believe it is a common misconception that this
> > > means you will never die; if all future branches involve your death,
> > > then you will die ... Quantum immortality does not imply that you can
> > > dodge every bullet and that the "you of today" will still live
> > > tomorrow, although the "you of yesterday" could still live tomorrow
> > > whilst the "you of today" does not.
> >
> > It would be the case if the multiverse contains "cul-de-sac" places... If you
> > take the approach that every moments have a successor moment, then quantum
> > immortality predict you'll never loose conscioussness.
> Could you explain it a bit more to me because I am still in
> disagreement with this, even when assuming RSSA ... Once every future
> branch involves your death; you will loose conscioussness, IMO. If you
> do not eat for 100 or 1000 years, you can still continue living
> according to you ?

No problem, unless as Brent Meeker suggests there is a minimum quantum of probability.
In some branch of the multiverse, aliens have secretly altered you so that although you
think you need to eat, your physiology is actually powered through radiated energy that
they beam at you from high orbit... or something like that.

> > > Also I personally do not believe ASSA favours a MWI interpretation of
> > > quantum mechanics over a deterministic one because a "single MWI
> > > universe" will be less probable than a "single deterministic universe".
> > > But it might favour MWI over Copenhagen interpretation.
> >
> > I personnaly believe ASSA is broken... because for one thing it cannot explain
> > stream of consciousness, arrow of time and so on... RSSA can.
> >
> > With RSSA you don't assume that "you" is sampled from all moments, but only
> > sampled from moments consistent where the current "you" is in.
> Do you believe that one can convince oneself that MWI is true, by doing
> a quantum suicide ?

Tegmark's paper suggests that you could prove MWI to yourself in this way, but not to
anyone else, who is likely to see you die. If you survived and published the results, the
next person who tried it would die from your point of view and everyone else's, so the
conclusion would be that your survival was due to fantastic luck. However, shouldn't
*you* also conclude that your survival was due to fantastic luck on the same basis?

Stathis Papaioannou
Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail.
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
For more options, visit this group at
Received on Sat Jan 20 2007 - 23:45:41 PST

This archive was generated by hypermail 2.3.0 : Fri Feb 16 2018 - 13:20:13 PST