Bruno Marchal writes:
> >> Bruno: If consciousness supervenes on all physical processes a case
> >> can be made that matter could be relevant for consciousness. (I see
> >> Peter Jones makes a similar remark).
> >
> > Stathis: Except that you could say the same for the Maudlin example,
> > in which it is shown that conscious can differ in two objects which do
> > not differ in physical activity: it does not strictly show that
> > physical activity (or more generally, matter) is unnecessary, just
> > that the usual definition of supervenience does not apply.
>
>
> OK, I guess that by "usual supervenience" you mean "physical
> supervenience". Both Maudlin and the movie graph show that the comp hyp
> is incompatible with usual (physical) supervenience. We both show (~
> comp OR ~ physical supervenience). This is equivalent with (comp -> ~
> physical supervenience) or with (physical supervenience -> ~ comp).
> Now I take comp, and I prove more (the UDA + Movie graph) gives more
> information than just the movie graph or Maudlin, and the acomp
> shows more and less. More in the sense that it gives the precise logic
> of comp-physical proposition; less because without much remaining work
> it gives only that. But the puzzle pieces fit enough together to expect
> some quantum computing provable to appear in the neighborhood of any
> lobian machines.
The usual definition of supervenience is that if A properties supervene on B
properties, the A properties cannot differ without the B properties also differing.
So if it can be shown that the one instant of B properties (the one physical state)
can be associated with more than one instant of A properties (two or more distinct
conscious states), then this wrecks the physical supervenience thesis. However, it
does not strictly show that *no* physical state at all is required for consciousness
to occur; I agree that this is a neater and more elegant conclusion but it doesn't follow.
> > You take comp and supervenience as two separate theories, but I would
> > bet that most computationalists take them as a package deal.
>
> Of course. But they are wrong. That package deal is made of sand. That
> is my point. Comp and physical supervenience is a bit little "molecular
> biology" + vitalism.
> The point of the UDA in 8 steps (that is UDA including the
> movie-graph/maudlin point) is really that nobody can be serious by
> keeping both comp and physical supervenience. But physical
> supervenience is obviously an invention of materialist (monist or
> dualist).
> If we keep comp you can easily understand that we have to go back on
> computational supervenience, and then we have to explain the origin of
> the physical laws from that.
I agree. I was just pointing out that computationalists are generally fond of
computers, and their raison d'etre would be challenged if the computers were
shown to be unnecessary.
> >> > I wonder if we are talking about the same thing, because it doesn't
> >> > seem to me that an empirical proof is needed to show that any
> >> physical > process could be seen as implementing any computation.
>
> >> This is not obvious at all. You need both empiry + a physical theory
> >> about that empiry, just to say that there is a physical process
> >> implementing if only one computation (to say nothing about all
> >> computations).
> >
> > All you need is one physical process.
>
> That is enough for my point.
>
>
> > If consciousness is in no way dependent on the details of this
> > physical process, then the actual physics is irrelevant.
>
> What does that means? If physical supervenience is correct
> consciousness has to be described by a non turing emulable *physical
> process* whatever details are needed or not, a part of it have to
> include an infinity of details (or it will be computationalist).
But physical supervenience isn't correct if comp [i.e. comp excluding the
physical supervenience part] is correct, as we are both arguing. This means
that consciousness is not dependent on any particular physical properties.
> > Do you see how, aside from one small detail, this is equivalent to
> > saying that consciousness is not dependent on any physical process at
> > all?
>
> I don't see this (but I see that this is going in the direction I argue
> it should go).
>
>
> > It doesn't matter if the machine loops, because the one physical state
> > can map to many different computational states.
>
> I can only *imagine* this, and this only together with some physical
> assumption. Remember that one of my goal is to explain what a "physical
> state" can possibly be. As you know I do not assume physics. I do not
> assume any physics.
>
>
> > Semantics is arbitrary.
>
> Hmmm... here I see what you mean, but I disagree. You consider some
> physical state (a fuzzy thing imo) and then *you* consider all the
> semantics, which *you* interpret as any or many computational states.
> Perhaps we should go back on the basic assumption.
Indeed, I provide the semantics, in language as in computer science. A string
of characters has no meaning unless an observer gives it meaning. However,
what of the special case where a computation is conscious, providing its own
observer even if all inputs/outputs are destroyed and there is no-one left who
is able to understand the details of its design?
> > But if you consider a physical computer the actual states
> > corresponding to the steps of the computation can be arbitrary. They
> > will be ordered in a certain consistent way, so we can utilise the
> > machine, but that is just a practical requirement. The natural number
> > 3 does not have to be written as "3" nor even as "III"; it could be
> > written as "II" on a Wednesday, "IIII" if the moon is full and "I" the
> > rest of the time. This has no effect on the platonic object 3, but it
> > does affect our ability to communicate and do arithmetic unless we
> > keep track of the notation. Similarly with a computation, we need to
> > be aware of the meaning of the states on a physical computer in order
> > to use it, but our awareness of the computer semantics does not
> > "create" the computation or imbue it with consciousness (if
> > computations can be conscious) any more than our awareness of
> > mathematical notation creates the number 3.
>
>
> The computational states just need to be *relatively* coherent. I have
> no idea what you mean by a "physical computer" for the reason that the
> term "physical" denotes different things relatively to the assumption
> we do.
By a physical world I mean just what appears to me to be a physical world.
This is a starting point, even if you later conclude beginning with this and
some other observations that there is no separate physical reality.
> > Why can't the black page contain everything that can possibly be
> > written, i.e. it can be a superposition of an infinite number of pages
> > with an infinite amount of ink?
>
> You mean a quantum superposition? (then with comp such a superposition
> really describes an infinity of immaterial computational histories in
> which each page contains a finite amount of ink. Well it is rather
> similar with the quantum mechanical superposition).
>
> The only sense in which (both with quantum field theory AND with the
> comp-physics) I can accept an infinite information on a black page is
> related to renormalization problem, spurious infinite energies ....
You're being too clever for me. I simply meant that a page on which a
large number of people had written (perhaps a digital page with digital
ink, so that it doesn't get saturated) would appear black. Once it is black,
more writing would not change its appearance, so a page with a million
superimposed English texts would look the same as a page with every
possible text in every possible language all superimposed.
> But then why to assume a physical world with all those infinities when
> comp forces us to deal with already enough infinities?
> You loss me I'm afraid. Are you trying to save both comp AND the
> physical supervenience?
No: one or other is flawed. But the evidence suggests that it is still possible
that *some* physical reality is needed for consciousness to occur, given
comp, even though the supervenience relationship does not apply. This is
a kludge; better to say either that consciousness is dependent on matter in
some well-behaved way like every other physical phenomenon, or completely
independent of matter - but I can't quite see how to do this.
>We have not yet derive the whole of physics
> from comp, but we can already expect the "mind-matter" mapping to be
> something quite complex. For me it is obvious that to a mind state
> there will be an infinity of "computational states and histories" going
> through that mind state. The reverse is harder because we are unable
> (assuming comp) to singularize a "comp-physical states". Physical
> states *are* already first person plural (inter-subjective) appearances
> emerging from the gluing and overlapping of infinities of computations
> (and thus immaterial(*)). Unless I am wrong, standard computationalism
> is flawed, like both the monist and dualist doctrine of materialism are
> flawed.
> It would be wrong to say that comp makes materialism refutated, but for
> a similar reason that it is wrong to say that bilogy has proves that
> vitalism is refutated. But biology has made vitalism
> explanation-useless, and computationalism makes materialism explantion
> useless too.
>
> Of course it remains the possibility that comp is incorrect. If comp is
> true, we have to live with that possibility forever.
OK, I agre with that.
Stathis Papaioannou
_________________________________________________________________
Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail.
http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d
--~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list.domain.name.hidden
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list-unsubscribe.domain.name.hidden
For more options, visit this group at
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
Received on Fri Jan 05 2007 - 21:09:27 PST