I guess I'm not too interested in worlds that are not self-observed,
but admit their existence for the sake of various arguments. Clearly
formal systems without concious entities exist in a mathematical sense
- for most purposes, I don't believe it actually matters whether they
physically exist.
Cheers
>
> In a message dated 99-10-05 01:45:10 EDT, Russell Standish writes:
>
> >Hmm... I would for the most part follow the many perspective
> >interpretation, however I consider that perspectives without conscious
> >observers may also be considered to exist, (in as much as they are
> >self-consistent) in that they may be able to be imagined by conscious
> >observers elsewhere in the plenitude.
>
> A perspective world without a conscious observer, seems to be a contradiction
> in terms. Yet you make the point that such a world can exist in the
> imagination of an observer elsewhere in the Plenitude. This world then exists
> or is simulated or dreamed in the observer's mind and is in fact observed by
> the observer's mind's eye. Is there an identical world out of his mind and in
> the Plenitude? If there is, we must go back to Leibniz Identity Principle
> (LIP). Are the world in the mind and the world in the Plenitude one and the
> same or are they different? If they are the same, then in a sense these
> worlds are observed by the observer's mind's eye. If they are different then
> what is the nature of this difference? The difference is not inherent in the
> worlds themselves. It lies in the presence or absence of a simulating
> observer, property which is outside these worlds! This is a contradiction.
> Thus, it appears that the only way out is to accept LIP for this particular
> case.
>
> The other case of a perspective world without a conscious observer, and which
> does not exist in any observer's mind is definitely a contradiction in terms.
> Such a world is just portion of the Plenitude which is out of reach of
> consciousness possibly because its inherent self contradictions prevents
> consciousness from arising within it or from imagining it. Do such worlds
> exist? In other words are there portions of the Plenitude which are
> inaccessible? I think that in this case, the verb "to be" loses its meaning
> and I rather not discuss it further.
>
> George Levy
>
>
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Dr. Russell Standish Director
High Performance Computing Support Unit,
University of NSW Phone 9385 6967
Sydney 2052 Fax 9385 6965
Australia R.Standish.domain.name.hidden
Room 2075, Red Centre
http://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks
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Received on Wed Oct 06 1999 - 22:14:28 PDT