Re: Summary

From: Russell Standish <>
Date: Thu, 7 Oct 1999 15:09:48 +1000 (EST)

I guess I'm not too interested in worlds that are not self-observed,
but admit their existence for the sake of various arguments. Clearly
formal systems without concious entities exist in a mathematical sense
- for most purposes, I don't believe it actually matters whether they
physically exist.


> In a message dated 99-10-05 01:45:10 EDT, Russell Standish writes:
> >Hmm... I would for the most part follow the many perspective
> >interpretation, however I consider that perspectives without conscious
> >observers may also be considered to exist, (in as much as they are
> >self-consistent) in that they may be able to be imagined by conscious
> >observers elsewhere in the plenitude.
> A perspective world without a conscious observer, seems to be a contradiction
> in terms. Yet you make the point that such a world can exist in the
> imagination of an observer elsewhere in the Plenitude. This world then exists
> or is simulated or dreamed in the observer's mind and is in fact observed by
> the observer's mind's eye. Is there an identical world out of his mind and in
> the Plenitude? If there is, we must go back to Leibniz Identity Principle
> (LIP). Are the world in the mind and the world in the Plenitude one and the
> same or are they different? If they are the same, then in a sense these
> worlds are observed by the observer's mind's eye. If they are different then
> what is the nature of this difference? The difference is not inherent in the
> worlds themselves. It lies in the presence or absence of a simulating
> observer, property which is outside these worlds! This is a contradiction.
> Thus, it appears that the only way out is to accept LIP for this particular
> case.
> The other case of a perspective world without a conscious observer, and which
> does not exist in any observer's mind is definitely a contradiction in terms.
> Such a world is just portion of the Plenitude which is out of reach of
> consciousness possibly because its inherent self contradictions prevents
> consciousness from arising within it or from imagining it. Do such worlds
> exist? In other words are there portions of the Plenitude which are
> inaccessible? I think that in this case, the verb "to be" loses its meaning
> and I rather not discuss it further.
> George Levy

Dr. Russell Standish Director
High Performance Computing Support Unit,
University of NSW Phone 9385 6967
Sydney 2052 Fax 9385 6965
Room 2075, Red Centre
Received on Wed Oct 06 1999 - 22:14:28 PDT

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