Re: Summary

From: Russell Standish <>
Date: Tue, 5 Oct 1999 15:40:51 +1000 (EST)

> In a message dated 99-10-01 07:28:42 EDT, Bruno Marchal writes:
> >>I would like to add something about LIP (Leibnitz Identity Principle) :
> >>I accept it in non-modal (extensional) context. For exemple if you tell me
> >> that a = 3, I accept that a + 1 = 4.
> >>But I don't accept it in modal (intensional) context. For exemple if you
> >> tell me that a = 3, I will NOT infer that "Jean knows that a + 1 = 4", for
> it
> >> is possible that although a = 3, Jean doesn't know it.
> >>What I have said in my last post follows from the fact that the 1-person
> >>and 3-person notion introduces modal contexts.
> >>Listen, people, I don't belief you can keep talking about worlds and
> >>observers without using a minimal amount of MODAL LOGIC.
> >>I told you that before.
> I agree Bruno, I don't know much about modal logic and I'll try to brush up
> on it. From what you wrote above, you are saying that LIP (Leibniz
> Indistinguishability Principle) comes in two flavors.
> The first is the non-modal extensional version which says that if two
> particular items appear indistiguishable to an observer, then in so far as
> this observer is concerned, these two items are one and the same. However, he
> cannot conclude that these two items will appear indistinguishable, and hence
> be identical to other observers. This conclusion is very much in keeping
> with Relativity Theory.
> The second version of LIP is the modal intensional version. It says that if
> two items appear to be indistinguishable to an observer, then these two
> items, not only are identical insofar as the observer is concerned, but are
> also indistinguishable and identical to other observers. This version
> supports a view of the world which is absolute.
> It seems that if we extrapolate the above, we are heading toward having to
> decide whether reality is subjective and relative, or objective and
> absolute. Extrapolating still further, we are led to having to make a choice
> between a Many-Perspectives Interpretation and a Many-Worlds interpretation.
> The Many-World Interpretation would support an objective world independent of
> the consciousness that inhabits it; and the Many-Perspective Interpretation
> would consider each SELF as the center of its own universe (perception) -
> kind of like a distributed solipsist point of view. The only absolute entity
> in the Many-Perspective Interpretation would be the Plenitude itself.
> George Levy

Hmm... I would for the most part follow the many perspective
interpretation, however I consider that perspectives without conscious
observers may also be considered to exist, (in as much as they are
self-consistent) in that they may be able to be imagined by conscious
observers elsewhere in the plenitude.

Dr. Russell Standish Director
High Performance Computing Support Unit,
University of NSW Phone 9385 6967
Sydney 2052 Fax 9385 6965
Room 2075, Red Centre
Received on Mon Oct 04 1999 - 22:45:06 PDT

This archive was generated by hypermail 2.3.0 : Fri Feb 16 2018 - 13:20:06 PST