RE: computer pain

From: Stathis Papaioannou <>
Date: Mon, 18 Dec 2006 09:39:15 +1100

If there is nothing wrong with the equations, it is always possible to predict the
behaviour of any piece of matter, right? And living matter is still matter, which
obeys all of the physical laws all of the time, right? It appeared from your previous
posts that you would disagree with this and predict that living matter would sometimes
do surprising, unpredictable things. In that case, your theory is logically consistent,
but you have to find evidence for it, and it would be easier to tease out the essential
unpredictable physical elements and test them in a physics lab.
> Date: Mon, 18 Dec 2006 07:17:10 +1100
> From:
> Subject: RE: computer pain
> To:
> >
> > I'm not sure of the details of your experiments, but wouldn't the most
> > direct way to prove what you are saying be to isolate just
> > that physical process
> > which cannot be modelled? For example, if it is EM fields, set up an
> > appropriately
> > brain-like configuration of EM fields, introduce some environmental input,
> > then
> > show that the response of the fields deviates from what Maxwell's
> > equations
> > would predict.
> >
> > Stathis Papaioannou
> I don't expect any deviation from Maxwell's equations. There's nothing
> wrong with them. It's just that they are merely a very good representation
> of a surface behaviour of the perceived universe in a particular context.
> Just like QM. But it's only the surface. The universe is not made of EM or
> QM or atoms or space. All these things are appearances. and it's what they
> are all actually made of with is what delivers its appearances.
> It's a pretty simple idea and it's been around for 300 years (and it's not
> a substance dualism!). The paper I'm writing at the moment (nearly
> finished) is about how this cultural delusion that the universe is made of
> our models pervades the low-level physical science. It's quite stark...the
> application of situated cognition to knowledge is quite pervasive. You can
> take a vertical slice all the way through the entire epistemological tree
> from social sciences down through psychology..cognitive
> science..ecology..ethology..anthropology ||
> neuroscience...chemistry..physics. The || is the sudden break where
> situated cognition matters and where physics, in particular cosmology is
> almost pathologically intent on the surgical excision of the scientist
> from the universe. Situated cognition applied to metascience at the level
> of physics is simply absent.
> You can see it in the desperate drive to make sense of QM maths, as if the
> universe is made of it...that the only way that any sense can be made of
> it is to write complex stories about infinite numbers of universes, all of
> which are somehow explanatory of the weirdness of the maths, rather then
> deal with what the universe is actually made of....when right in front of
> all of them is the perfect way out...start talking about what universes
> must be made of in order that it can omplement scientists that have
> realise that the maths of empirical laws is just a model
> of the stuff, not the stuff.
> Cosmologists are the key. They have some sort of mass fantasy going about
> the mathematics they use. Totally unfounded assumptions pervade their
> craft - far worse than any assumption that the universe is not made of
> idealsised maths...the thing that gets labeled erroneously 'metaphysics'
> and eschewed.
> I have done a cartoon representation of a cosmologist made of stuff in a
> unoiverse of stuff staring at the cosmos wondering where all teh stuff is,
> when the fact of be able to stare _at all_ is telling him about the deep
> nature of of the cosmos. Poor little deluded cosmologist.
> There's nothing wrong with Maxwell's equations. In fact there's nothing
> wrong with any empirical laws. The problem is us...
> cheers,
> colin
> >
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Received on Sun Dec 17 2006 - 17:39:33 PST

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