RE: computer pain

From: Colin Geoffrey Hales <>
Date: Mon, 18 Dec 2006 08:15:52 +1100 (EST)

Stathis said....
> and Colin has said that he does not believe that philosophical zombies
can exist.
> Hence, he has to show not only that the computer model will lack the 1st
> experience, but also lack the 3rd person observable behaviour of the
real thing;
> and the latter can only be the case if there is some aspect of brain
physics which
> does not comply with any possible mathematical model.
> Stathis Papaioannou

I just thought of a better way of explaining 'deviation'.

Maxwell's equations are not 'unique' in the sense that there are an
infinite number of different charge configurations that will produce the
same field congurations around some surface. This is a very old
result....was it Poisson who said it? can't remember.

Anyway.... I will be presenting different objects to my 'chip scientists',
but I will be presenting them in such a way as the sensory measurement is
literally identical.

What I expect to happen is that the field configuration I find emerging in
the guts of the chips will be different, depending on the object, even
though the sensory measurement is identical. The different field
configurations will correspond to the different objects. That is what
subjective experience will look like from the "outside".

The chip's 'solution' to the charge cnfiguration will take up a
configuration based on the non-locality...hence the scientists will report
different objects, even when their sensory measurement is identical, and
it is the only apparent access they have to the object (to us).

I think that's more like what you are after... there's no "failure to
obey" maxwell's equations, but their predictions as to charge
configuration is not a unique solution. The trick is to realise that the
sensory maeasurement has to be there in order that _any_ solution be
found, not a _particular_ solution.

pretty simple really. does that make more sense?



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Received on Sun Dec 17 2006 - 16:16:16 PST

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