Re: UDA revisited

From: Quentin Anciaux <allcolor.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Fri, 24 Nov 2006 11:22:22 +0100

Hi Colin,
Le Vendredi 24 Novembre 2006 05:48, Colin Geoffrey Hales a écrit :
> >> > Fair enough, but this is a direct contradiction with the assumption of
> >> > computationalism.
> >>
> >> This is a 'assume comp' playground only? I am up for not assuming
> >> anything.....but if computationalism is actually false then it becomes a
> >> religion or a club or something.
> >
> > Not at all. I don't even subscribe to computationalism most days, but
> > it is a powerful metaphor for reasoning. Nevertheless it is important
> > to know in any argument if you assume it or not. Otherwise you may
> > have the sort of argument:
> >
> > If computationalism is false, then I show that computationalism is
> > false.
> >
> > which is not especially interesting.
>
> I agree very 'not interesting' ... a bit like saying "assuming comp"
> endlessly.....and never being able to give it teeth.
>
> ... I am more interested in proving scientists aren't/can't be
> zombies....that it seems to also challenge computationalism in a certain
> sense... this is a byproduct I can't help, not the central issue.
>
> Colin
I don't see how the idea of zombies could challenge computationalism... Zombie
is an argument against dualism... in other way it is the ability to construct
a functionnal identical being as a conscious one yet the zombie is not
conscious. Computationalism does not predict zombie simply because
computationalism is one way to explain consciousness.
Quentin
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Received on Fri Nov 24 2006 - 05:20:38 PST

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