Re: UDA revisited

From: Russell Standish <lists.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Tue, 21 Nov 2006 09:19:09 +1100

On Mon, Nov 20, 2006 at 02:35:50PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> Le 18-nov.-06, à 03:53, Russell Standish a écrit :
>
> >
> > I had a thought about an alternative way of expressing the UDA
> > (universal dovetailer argument).
> >
> > Computationalism is the statement that "I am a computation".
>
> I disagree. Well to be sure "disagreement is relative", and when I say
> I disagree with you, it is not comparable with the disagreement with P.
> Jones and apparently Brent Meker (who seems to discard the quantum MW
> as well like if they were back at stage one on the everything
> discussion!).
> It would have been more correct to say "my life is a computation"
> instead of "I am a computation". It could be misleading at some points.
> Programs and machines are finite object (codable by natural numbers).
> Computation are infinite (in general) and not all can be even just
> associated to finite objects.
>
This is really a disagreement with what "I" is, which in any case is
one of those ill-defined terms that can mean many things - do we mean
a machine (protein or otherwise), do we mean a program, or do we mean
a process. In this case, I'm obviously referring to a process.
> >
> > To say that there must be a physical computer on which the dovetailer
> > should run, is rather similar to saying there must be an ultimate
> > turtle upon which the world rests.
>
> To say this you need induction, that is you need a theory of numbers
> (like PA, ZF or even just RA).
> But once you have RA, PA, or ZF, you do have an ultimate turtle!
> True the UD will generate all possible UDs, but the "first one" is
> unavoidable once you accept the notion of natural numbers together with
> addition and multiplication. So why not take this into consideration?
>
The first one? It doesn't matter whether you're implemented using a UD
running on a bare physical substrate, as on a 15th nested UD or a
Googolplex+1 th nested one. You cannot tell the difference from the
inside - that's the point of computationalism. Just as importantly, if
there were an infinite nest of UDs, or the UD nest looped so that the
UD in which you're implemented also executed itself, you still couldn't
tell.
This, I think is the true meaning of Platonic existence. A means of
renormalising "infinite regressions".
It seems lots of folk have trouble accepting infinities or causal
cycles - but I have just as much trouble accepting ones where the
"buck stops here".
>
>
>
> > The little old lady was right in
> > saying "its turtles all the way down". Of course it is also analogous
> > to saying there must be a prime mover to start the causal chain. If
> > God created the world, then it immediately poses the question "Who
> > created God".
> >
> > Since it makes no difference in any observable respect whether we are
> > living in a computer simulation running on a bare substrate, as one
> > that is incidently computated as part of a universal dovetailer, or an
> > infinite chain of dovetailers, we really can make use of Laplace's
> > ripost to Napoleon "Sire, I have no need of that hypothesis" with
> > respect to a concrete computer running our world.
>
>
>
> OK, but note that this should be explained more precisely through the
> 1-3 pov distinctions.
>
I wasn't aiming at precision, but clarity. We need the gut feeling
that this is how it is when one assumes computationalism.
I have to admit that when I came to express the concept in an email,
it didn't have the same clarity it had the other morning ... sigh!
--
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Mathematics
UNSW SYDNEY 2052 hpcoder.domain.name.hidden
Australia http://www.hpcoders.com.au
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Received on Mon Nov 20 2006 - 17:19:34 PST

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