RE: A nerw idea to play with

From: Higgo James <james.higgo.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Mon, 6 Sep 1999 16:55:15 +0100

Unless you deny quentum theory, analogue is an approximation of digital.
That's the meaning of 'quantum'.

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Marchal [SMTP:marchal.domain.name.hidden]
> Sent: Monday, September 06, 1999 2:31 PM
> To: everything-list.domain.name.hidden
> Subject: Re: A nerw idea to play with
>
> > Gilles Henri wrote:
> >For me digital systems are systems whose some characteristics
> (description
> >and evolution of their "state") are EXACTLY equivalent to a TM. All our
> >computers are obviously of this type. All systems that are not known to
> be
> >digital must be considered as analogical (in fact they are all analogical
>
> >at another level of description). The burden of proof is for the
> >demonstration of "digital character", the default value being
> analogicalness.
>
> Do you think that a distance of 10^-500 has a accepted meaning for any
> physicist. Some physicist and mathematician believe that "analogical"
> system are "idealisations". At least with the "digital" there is Church
> Thesis which makes things clearer.
>
> >I do not know any description of our brain that is obviously exactly
> >equivalent to some TM. I would be very happy if someone in this group
> >could give me one.
>
> Any reasonable quantized version of Schroedinger equation. Nobody has ever
> proved the necessity of non-computable real numbers there. Only Penrose
> seems to search non-computability there, for rather obscur reasons.
>
> >Independantly of the practical possibility, I see no reason why
> duplicated
> >people would fail the Turing test.
>
> I see no reason too. Comp is indeed the hypothesis that duplicated people
> are equivalent from their first person point of view.
> Well, of course comp ask for a digital truncation.
>
> >I agree completely with you- comp2 is actually the hypothesis that the
> >computation of the physical properties of an analogical machine (e.g. our
>
> >brain) can emulate this machine from the first person point of view.
>
> I don't understand. Comp need the digital "approximation".
> The discussion here will be impossible if you don't tell me precisely what
> is an analogical machine, without using the vague "continuum feeling"
> which
> is what I want to explain.
>
> All what I say is that IF comp is correct THEN
>
> 1) There is no need to postulate the existence of a substancial
> universe,
> 2) There is a simple explanation (WTP) why we 'see' many universe.
> (WTP =
> the Weak Turing-tropic Principle)
> 3) The idea that we can disappear (die) can only be whishfull thinking
> 4) ALL physical predicate are computationnal modalities, and ALL
> physical
> laws are deducible from computer science/number theory.
>
> It is still possible that IF comp is correct THEN there are flying
> rabbits
> or just Noise, etc. (So that comp would be refuted).
>
> I like COMP because it makes possible to work with a concrete plenitude
> principle (George Levy term), and it implies (easily) apparent
> indeterminism,
> non-locality, and our belief in the continuum.
>
> And if you take a substancial continuum for granted (like Penrose), then
> OK,
> comp must be false for you. I have no problem with that.
>
> The problem exists only for people (the majority!, perhaps not in
> this list), who believe (implicitly or explicitly) in comp AND who believe
> at the same time in a "physical substancial material" Universe.
>
> The problem (misunderstanding) between us is not philosophical but
> methodological. I don't want to defend comp, just to put it toward its
> logical
> limits.
> If we ever find a real contradiction in comp, we will be both winner here.
> But we must not confuse the strange with the absurd, or the
> counter-intuitive
> with the contradictory.
> And untill now, comp seems to be confirmed by the facts (cf QM, MWI, etc.)
>
> Bruno.
>
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Received on Mon Sep 06 1999 - 09:00:04 PDT