David Nyman wrote:
> 1Z wrote:
>
>
>
> > Assuming that everything necessary for consciousness at time can be
> > contained
> > in a 0-duration snapshot at time t. However, If consciousness
> > supervenes on a process,
> > however that assumption is not true.
>
> As you know I've been attempting to give an account of this. I concur
> that BU theories do appear to entail what you say above, when you strip
> out implicit question-begging reliance on 'continuity'.
What do you mean by "what you say above"
"That everything necessary for consciousness at time can be
contained in a 0-duration snapshot at time t."?
or
"That everything necessary for consciousness at time can NOT be
contained in a 0-duration snapshot at time t."?
> Consequently,
> in a BU, conscious 'temporal' sequences must be represented
> *structurally* by some sort of compresent 'time capsule' approach
> (following Barbour).
I'm still not sure what you are saying here. But note
that it is perfectly possible for a high-level
property to supervene on, and only on,
a spatially unlocalised state-of-affairs.
Since BU's treat time like space, it is at
least possible for consciousness to supervene on,
and only on, temporally extended segments of the block.
> We then have to account for the appearance of
> 'process' - i.e. dynamic differentiation in experience - and so far
> you've made no comment about my attempts to give an account of this,
> which I admit are a bit weird, though possibly insufficiently so.
>
> David
>
>
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Received on Sun Oct 29 2006 - 19:55:01 PST