1Z wrote:
> Assuming that everything necessary for consciousness at time can be
> contained
> in a 0-duration snapshot at time t. However, If consciousness
> supervenes on a process,
> however that assumption is not true.
As you know I've been attempting to give an account of this. I concur
that BU theories do appear to entail what you say above, when you strip
out implicit question-begging reliance on 'continuity'. Consequently,
in a BU, conscious 'temporal' sequences must be represented
*structurally* by some sort of compresent 'time capsule' approach
(following Barbour). We then have to account for the appearance of
'process' - i.e. dynamic differentiation in experience - and so far
you've made no comment about my attempts to give an account of this,
which I admit are a bit weird, though possibly insufficiently so.
David
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > Peter Jones writes:
> >
> > > > > > Here is another thought experiment. You are watching an object moving against a
> > > > > > stationary background at a velocity of 10 m/s. Suddenly, the object seems to instantly
> > > > > > jump 10 metres in the direction of motion, and then continues as before at 10 m/s. You
> > > > > > are informed that one of the following three events has taken place:
> > > > > >
> > > > > > (a) your consciousness was suspended for 1 second, as in an absence seizure;
> > > > > >
> > > > > > (b) you were scanned, annihilated, and a perfect copy created in your place 1 second
> > > > > > later;
> > > > > >
> > > > > > (c) nothing unusual happened to you, but the object you were watching was instantly
> > > > > > teleported 10 metres in the direction of motion.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Would you be able to guess which of the three events took place?
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Stathis Papaioannou
> > > > >
> > > > > Sure, it was (a). (c) violates the laws of physics. (b) might or might not be theoretically possible, but it's practically impossible.
> > > >
> > > > OK, you would probably be right if you were kidnapped and subjected to this experiment
> > > > tomorrow. But it's a thought experiment, and my point is that from your conscious
> > > > experience alone you would be unable to distinguish between the three cases. Peter Jones'
> > > > posts seem to imply that you would notice a difference.
> > >
> > > You have to say that, given a particular theory of consciousness,
> > > would you notice a difference. If physical counterfactuals/causality
> > > is important, you could in cases a) and b), since they
> > > all involve an abnormal causal transition from one OM to
> > > then next. Given computationalism, it is less straightforward.
> >
> > The question is independent of your theory of consciousness. Say consciousness
> > is based on process C. I trust you will assume that process C is entirely physical, but
> > suppose it involves God animating your brain with his breath. Then in case (a) God stops
> > breathing for a second, in case (b) God destroys you and makes a perfect copy which he
> > reanimates a second later, and case (c) is unchanged. The important point is, when you
> > are destroyed then rebuilt, the new version of you is perfectly identical to the original and
> > functions exactly the same as the original would have. It seems to me *logically* impossible
> > that you could distinguish between the three cases.
>
> Assuming that everything necessary for consciousness at time can be
> contained
> in a 0-duration snapshot at time t. However, If consciousness
> supervenes on a process,
> however that assumption is not true.
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Received on Sun Oct 29 2006 - 19:04:27 PST