Hi Colin,
I am not sure I understand your point. Would you say that Derek Denton
work is conflicting with comp?
Actually comp can explain why we cannot attribute some brain *function*
to some brain *part* activity. Such relation are described by G* (true
but unprovable or unverifiable).
Only an argument showing that some part of the brain use "physical
infinities" would be a stress for comp.
Not really the time to say more now(*).
Bruno
(*) I have not even the time to just read the other mail before sunday
... But then I see Quentin, Tom and others manage rather well most of
Peter's current critical remarks.
Le 27-oct.-06, à 02:45, Colin Hales a écrit :
>
> Hi Bruno,
>
> Derek Denton in....
>
> Denton D. 2005. The Primordial Emotions: The dawning of consciousness:
> Oxford University Press. 267 p.
>
> ....is able to point to activated regions of basal brain in a human
> subject
> undergoing extreme thirst. It isn’t easy to control for obfuscating
> parameters but he did it. Dry mouth, wet mouth, blood salt levels,
> micturition thwarting...etc...He can point (in fMRI) to a single small
> cohort of cellular material unambiguously responsible for thirst
> qualia (a
> primordial emotion). One cohort does it. Another nearby in the same
> activated chain doesn't. Totally outside the cerebral cortex.
>
> If COMP is correct it should be telling us why that is and what to
> look for.
>
> Exactly what computational process corresponds to the difference
> between the
> two cohorts in first person presentation?
>
> What is it about COMP as an abstraction that renders that difference
> invariant? (being a real cellular version vs being a COMP version of
> the
> same thing)
>
> This is a glaring, large scale (well beyond quantum levels) phenomenon,
> right in your face at the cellular level and above.
>
> Perhaps you can shed some light on COMP in this regard, because I
> can’t see
> it.
>
> Regards,
>
> Colin Hales
> (EC still brewing!)
>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: everything-list.domain.name.hidden [mailto:everything-
>> list.domain.name.hidden] On Behalf Of Bruno Marchal
>> Sent: Thursday, October 26, 2006 8:23 PM
>> To: everything-list.domain.name.hidden
>> Subject: Re: Numbers, Machine and Father Ted
>>
>>
>>
>> Le 23-oct.-06, à 00:12, 1Z a écrit :
>>
>>> Huh? Computationalism is no more able to account for
>>> qualia than physicalism.
>>
>>
>>
>> Computationalism (the standard one) through my work (don't hesitate to
>> criticize it) gives a precise account of qualia.
>> It is even a refutable theory of both quanta and qualia, given that
>> quanta are shown to be sharable qualia (first person plural).
>> If the comp quanta behavior are shown to contradict empirical quanta,
>> then that would refute the comp theory of of both qualia and quanta,
>> and actually this would refute comp, even acomp (comp without "yes
>> doctor").
>>
>> Contrarywise, everyone a bit serious in philosophy of mind agrees that
>> physicalist theories have not yet succeed in just approaching or
>> formulating the the qualia problem.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>>
>>
>>
>
> >
>
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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Received on Fri Oct 27 2006 - 08:58:54 PDT