Le 22-oct.-06, 1Z (peterdjones.domain.name.hidden) wrote:
> Bruno's versions of COMP must embed Platonism (passim)
You keep saying that, and I keep telling you that I need only
Arithmetical Realism, which is defined by the belief that classical
logic is sound for arithmetic. I use often the expression "platonia"
for a place where all machines run forever or stop. Or, if I refer to
Plato, it means I refer to some precise proposition in Plato's
Theaetetus, or in its Parmenides.
So AR is indeed a very weak hypothesis, and has nothing to do with what
you call Platonism.
Given that "platonism" seems to be too much charged, I propose to keep
the expression "Arithmetical realism" instead. It is, I recall, the
belief that arithmetical propositions are true or false. (Excluded
middle applies).
Le 22-oct.-06, à 20:31, David Nyman a écrit :
> Must I assume that by 'Platonism' here you mean COMP? We do need, I
> think, to make a clear distinction in these discussions between
>
> 1) 'Computationalism', a theory (implicitly or explicitly) based on
> materialism, although in a manner which (witness our recent dialogues),
> at least so far as its putative association with consciousness is
> concerned, in an entirely 'relational' manner which is extremely opaque
> as to its roots in 'physical causality'.
>
> and
>
> 2) COMP - a theory which posits the emergence of 'matter' as a measure
> on a computationally prior 1-person level - hence defining its
> axiomatic base solely in terms of computational fundamentals - CT, AR,
> etc.
Here I disagree, or if you want make that distinction (introduced by
Peter), you can sum up the conclusion of the UD Argument by:
Computationalism entails COMP.
But I prefer to consider COMP just as a precise version of standard
computationalism.
Then the UDA shows, or is supposed at least to show, that if we believe
in computationalism (perhaps even motivated by materialism at first)
then
we get an epistemological contradiction, so that we have to abandon
either computationalism or materialism.
The contradiction is only epistemological: it is possible to keep a
belief in material stuff with comp, but it is impossible to relate that
stuff with consciousness and subjective experience, including
consciousness of experimental result in physics. So UDA shows that the
notion of primitive or fundamental matter can not been used to explain
result of any experience in physics.
Of course such a result is annoying for materialist because
computationalism is their favorite implicit or explicit theory of
mind. My point is that it does not work.
Although Penrose uses incorrectly Godel theorems, I agree with his
conclusion: if you want a universe made of primitive matter, then the
only way to make consciousness "physical" or "material" will consist in
abandoning comp in the philosophy of mind. You will have to attach
consciousness to actual material infinite. If you want to keep comp
instead, you have to abandon the notion of primitive matter. But in
that case, of course, you have to explain the appearance of matter
from and only from comp. OK?
Descartes was already aware that mechanism (even non digital) is a
threat for materialism. His solution has consisted in positing an
infinitely good God, unable to cheat us, so that our material illusion
is founded by God's Goodness. I don't follow him that far, but
Descartes solution is in the same spirit as the use of
"self-consistency" bets explanation of matter by the lobian machine.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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Received on Mon Oct 23 2006 - 08:27:21 PDT