David Nyman wrote:
> 1Z wrote:
>
> > I don't see why. Are you saying they are still closed
> > even if their information content is similar? Why should that be?
> > How can I fail to have similar information content
> > to myself five minutes form now? Why doesn't it apply
> > spatially? Why doensnt each neuron have its own
> > consciousness?
>
> What I mean by 'closed' is that not merely the objects of perception,
> but the means of acquisition of perceptual content (i.e. the dyad), are
> alike constrained by the information content - or structure - of the OM
> itself. There isn't a further 'sympathetic' - or whatever - access to
> information due to 'similarity' - by what process could this occur?
Yes -- in terms of causality, process, dynamic time, counterfactuals,
etc. In terms of Platonia and block universes, informational
similarity becomes more important because process and causation
are less important.
> As
> to each neuron having its own 'consciousness', this is neither here nor
> there - whatever could the *content* of such consciousness be?
The molecule-by-molecule information content of a neuron would be quite
complex.
>The very
> point is that there must be a complex interaction, seamlessly relating
> perceiver-process with percept-process (e.g. constructing memory,
> representation, etc.), in order for the 'I' to emerge and coherently
> assert itself. We know this from the way such processes fragment and
> break down under the impact of Alzheimers and short-term memory
> disfunction. Self-referential consciousness can only be sustained
> through a highly organised *process*, not merely an inherent
> undifferentiated quality.
Is there process in a BU?
> So of course 'you' have similar information content 'five minutes from
> now'. This is how you (and we) make the identification that this
> particular 'I' is 'you' - the persistency of information through which
> 'you' can be tracked. It's also the only distinction between 'you' and
> 'me'. So for this reason there would be exactly the same argument for
> (or against) 'sympathetic overlap' between OMs containing you, and
> those containing me. And, interesting though this might be, personally
> I fail to experience any such communion, short of this particular
> channel of information that (literally) connects our respective OMs.
>
> David
>
>
> > David Nyman wrote:
> > > 1Z wrote:
> > >
> > > > Why are POV's divided temporally?. If the BU theory predicts that they
> > > > are not, it must be rejected.
> > >
> > > I don't think this is what needs to be at issue to resolve this point.
> >
> > Well, I think it is. Perhaps you could say why it is not.
> >
> > > The key aspect is that the structure of each OM is inherently what
> > > might be termed a perceiver-percept dyad - that is, it must contain
> > > whatever process or structure is involved both in *representing* the
> > > available information and *responding* perceptually to it. This makes
> > > each dyad *informationally* closed with respect to other such dyads,
> > > without reference to their 'temporal' or 'spatial' separation.
> >
> > I don't see why. Are you saying they are still closed
> > even if their information content is similar? Why should that be?
> > How can I fail to have similar information content
> > to myself five minutes form now? Why doesn't it apply
> > spatially? Why doensnt each neuron have its own
> > consciousness?
> >
> > > Consequently, in a BU, you shouldn't expect to have an experience of:
> > >
> > > > A consciousness spread across time.
> > >
> > > if by this, you mean some sort of simultaneous awareness of multiple
> > > 'I's. This would require an extra-hypothetical 'super-I' process or
> >
> > There is *a* process which links spatially separated neurons
> > into a single consciousness. I don't claim to know what it is.
> > But if time is just like space, as the BU theory has it, why doesn't
> > it apply across time.
> >
> > > > We *do* have simultaneous consciousness -- just not
> > > > the same consciousness.
> > >
> > > Which is precisely my point. Just as you *do* have simultaneous
> > > consciousness of all OMs in which you are present - just not the same
> > > consciousness.
> >
> > But the difference of your and my consiousness
> > is explained by the difference in content. My consciousness
> > five minutes from now cannot fail to be 99% the same as my
> > consciousness
> > now, information-wise.
> >
> > > There is no logical distinction between the two cases,
> > > unless you are positing the existence of a soul. The distinction
> > > between the OMs in which the 'I' is you, and those in which the 'I' is
> > > me, is entirely informationally determined and delimited. There is no
> > > other means of differentiation.
> >
> > Which is precisely my point. My consciousness
> > five minutes from now cannot fail to be 99% the same as my
> > consciousness
> > now, information-wise.
> >
> >
> > > David
> > >
> > > > David Nyman wrote:
> > > > > 1Z wrote:
> > > > >
> > > > > > The problem is not that there would be gaps, the problem
> > > > > > is that they would all be conscious simultaneously.
> > > > >
> > > > > Peter, I know from the above and previous comments you have made that
> > > > > this notion of multiple compresent consciousness seems to you to
> > > > > contradict your own experience, but I just can't see why. The crucial
> > > > > point about our 1-person experience is that it's inherently
> > > > > informationally self-limiting - i.e. we can only define ourselves in
> > > > > terms of whatever information we have access to from a given pov.
> > > >
> > > > Why are POV's divided temporally?. If the BU theory predicts that they
> > > > are not, it must be rejected.
> > > >
> > > > > And
> > > > > surely this is what prevents us from having the kind of 'multiple'
> > > > > experiences you have in mind. In fact, it illustrates the fundamental
> > > > > intension of the indexical term 'I' - other 'versions' of ourselves,
> > > > > informationally separated temporally and/or spatially, could equally
> > > > > validly be considered clones from any given 'present' pov.
> > > >
> > > > I don't see how POV's can be logically prior
> > > > to a space time structure.
> > > >
> > > > > This is why
> > > > > I have previously been so insistent about the 'global' nature of the
> > > > > 1-person (although I know this has led to terminological confusion).
> > > > > Its 'globality' consists in the fact that *any* suitably constituted
> > > > > region of reality equally partakes of this self-referential experience
> > > > > of 'I'.
> > > > > But the *content* of each 1-person OM is inherently limited by
> > > > > its information content. Doesn't this image do the trick for you?
> > > > >
> > > > > > > All I know is what I am
> > > > > > > experiencing *now*.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Yes. That is the phenomenological fact that contradicts the BU.
> > > > >
> > > > > But it doesn't. What do you think you would experience in a BU
> > > > > (focusing on the presence of observer moments, rather than the A-series
> > > > > versus B-series issue)?
> > > >
> > > > A consciousness spread across time.
> > > >
> > > > > What process exists that could coherently
> > > > > totalise or synthesise in some way the informationally separated OMs?
> > > >
> > > > The question is what could make the conscious one-at-a-time
> > > > if not the flow of time.
> > > >
> > > > > You might as well say that you and I should somehow have overlapping
> > > > > consciousness right now.
> > > >
> > > > We *do* have simultaneous consciousness -- just not
> > > > the same consciousness.
> > > >
> > > > > Well, we don't, because we have different
> > > > > information horizons - and just *this much* information crosses these
> > > > > barriers to become part of our joint conciousness. I think the analogy
> > > > > is pretty direct.
> > > >
> > > > My future selves will contain information from my
> > > > present self. But they are not conscious *yet*.
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > > David
> > > > >
> > > > > > Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > > > > > > Peter Jones writes:
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > The other issue matter is able to explain as a result of having no
> > > > > > > > > > properties of its own is the issue of change and time. For change to be
> > > > > > > > > > distinguishable from mere succession, it must be change in something.
> > > > > > > > > > It could be a contingent natural law that certain properties never
> > > > > > > > > > change. However, with a propertiless substrate, it becomes a logical
> > > > > > > > > > necessity that the substrate endures through change; since all changes
> > > > > > > > > > are changes in properties, a propertiless substrate cannot itself
> > > > > > > > > > change and must endure through change. In more detail here
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > Why must "change... be change in something"? It sort of sounds reasonable
> > > > > > > > > but it is our duty to question every assumption and weed out the superfluous
> > > > > > > > > ones. If there is an object with (space, time, colour) coordinates (x1, t1, red)
> > > > > > > > > and another object (x1, t2, orange), then we say that the object has changed
> > > > > > > > > from red to orange.
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > If we already know what distinguishes the time co-ordinate
> > > > > > > > from the space co-ordinate. What is our usual
> > > > > > > > way of doing that? The time co-ordinate is the one that is always
> > > > > > > > changing...
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > Time and Possibility
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > Imagine a universe in which there was no change, nothing actually
> > > > > > > > occurs. In the absence of events, it would be imposssible to
> > > > > > > > distinguish any point in timw from any other point. There would be no
> > > > > > > > meaning to time -- such a universe would be timeless.
> > > > > > > > Now imagine a universe which is completely chaotic. Things change so
> > > > > > > > completely from one moment to the next that there are no conistent
> > > > > > > > things. This universe is made up solely of events, which can be
> > > > > > > > labelled with 4 coordinates . [ x,y,z,t]. But which coordinate is the
> > > > > > > > time coordinate ? One could just as well say [ y,t,z,x]. In the absence
> > > > > > > > of persistent ojects there is nothing to single out time as a
> > > > > > > > 'direction' in a coordinate system. So again time is meaingless.
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > In order to have a meaningful Time, you need a combination of sameness
> > > > > > > > (persisitent objects) and change (events). So time is posited on being
> > > > > > > > able to say:
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > "Object A changed from state S1 at time T1 to state S2 at time T2."
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > You're just stating that time is different from space. Time and space are also
> > > > > > > different from colour, or any other property an object may have. If we didn't
> > > > > > > have time there would be no change, if we didn't have height everything would
> > > > > > > be flat, and if we didn't have colour everything would be black.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > But it isn't an arbitrary difference.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > I don't see how a physical multiverse would be distinguishable from a virtual
> > > > > > > > > reality or a mathematical reality (assuming the latter is possible, for the sake
> > > > > > > > > of this part of the argument). The successive moments of your conscious
> > > > > > > > > experience do not need to be explicitly linked together to "flow" and they do
> > > > > > > > > not need to be explicitly separated, either in separate universes or in separate
> > > > > > > > > rooms, to be separate.
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > I've never seen an HP universe. Yet they *must* exist in a mathematical
> > > > > > > > reality, because there are no random gaps in Platonia. Since all
> > > > > > > > mathematical
> > > > > > > > structures are exemplified, the structure corresponging to (me up till
> > > > > > > > 1 second ago)
> > > > > > > > + (purple dragons) must exist. If there is nothing
> > > > > > > > mathematical to keep out of HP universe, the fact that I have never
> > > > > > > > seen one is
> > > > > > > > evidence against a mathematical multiverse.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > That you don't experience HP universes is as much an argument against a physical
> > > > > > > multiverse as it is an argument against a mathematical multiverse.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Not "as much". It depends on how constrained they are.
> > > > > > Physical multiverses can be almost as constrained as single universes,
> > > > > > or almost as unconstrained as multiverses.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > > If a physical MV
> > > > > > > exists, then in some branch you will encounter purple dragons in the next second.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > With a very low measure.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > > The fact that you don't means that either there is no physical multiverse or there is
> > > > > > > a physical multiverse but the purple dragon experience is of low measure. Similarly in
> > > > > > > a mathematical multiverse the HP experiences may be of low measure.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Physical multiversalists can choose measure to match observation (that
> > > > > > is
> > > > > > basically how the SWE is arrived at). Mathematical multiversalists
> > > > > > cannot choose an arbitrary measure, because nothing is arbitrary or
> > > > > > contingnet
> > > > > > in Platonia. Measure has to emerge naturally and necessarily for them.
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > If you died today and just by accident a possible next
> > > > > > > > > moment of consciousness was generated by a computer a trillion years in the
> > > > > > > > > future, then ipso facto you would find yourself a trillion years in the future.
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > That's the whole problem. I could just as easily find myself in an HP
> > > > > > > > universe. But I never do.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > Not "just as easily". If you are destructively scanned and a moment from now 2 copies
> > > > > > > of you are created in Moscow and 1 copy created in Washington, you have a 2/3 chance
> > > > > > > of finding yourself in Moscow and a 1/3 chance of finding yourself in Washington.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > What's that got to do with Platonia? Platonia contains every
> > > > > > configuration of matter.
> > > > > > (Snd no time). Configurations where I'm in Moscow, configurations where
> > > > > > I'm in Washington,
> > > > > > configurations where I'm on the moon, configurations where I'm in
> > > > > > Narnia.
> > > > > > There is no unaccountable fact to the effect that there is 1 copy of me
> > > > > > in Moscow,
> > > > > > 2 in Washington, and 0 on the moon. There are no random gaps in
> > > > > > Platonia.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > (That's the "mathematical* mutiverse of course. A physical mutliverse
> > > > > > is an entirely different matter).
> > > > > >
> > > > > > > It is a
> > > > > > > real problem to explain why the HP universes are less likely to be experienced than the
> > > > > > > orderly ones (see chapter 4.2 of Russell Standish' book for a summary of some of the
> > > > > > > debates on this issue), but it is not any more of a problem for a mathematical as opposed
> > > > > > > to a physical multiverse.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Not at all. P-multiversalists can and do choose measure to match
> > > > > > observation.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > But if you had the successive moments of your consciousness implemented
> > > > > > > > > in parallel, perhaps as a simulation on a powerful computer, it would be impossible
> > > > > > > > > to tell that this was the case. For all you are aware, there may not *be* any past
> > > > > > > > > moments: your present experience may include false memories of your past, and
> > > > > > > > > whole world may have been created a second ago.
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > A simulation running on a computer is still a dynamic, temporal
> > > > > > > > process. The point is that the passage of
> > > > > > > > time tells me that I am not in Platonia.
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > Time Capsules: Getting Flow from Sequence.
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > Proponents of the Block Universe view believe that there is only a
> > > > > > > > B-Series. Some think that alone is adequate to explain the subjective
> > > > > > > > Flow-of-Time. It is easy enough to see how there could be a sequence in
> > > > > > > > the B series. If we consider a series of 3 dimensional "snapshots" of
> > > > > > > > someone's brain, each subsequent snapshot iwll contain information
> > > > > > > > relating back to previous ones.
> > > > > > > > But is this chain or sequence enough to establish flow ? A B-series
> > > > > > > > without an A-series is like a spatial series. If you had a series of
> > > > > > > > clones arranged spatially so that clone 2 has all of clone 1's memories
> > > > > > > > (and more), clone 3 has all of clone 2's memories (and more) and so on,
> > > > > > > > you would not expect anything to be flowing from one clone to another.
> > > > > > > > The clones form a series of "time capsules", and a such they have a
> > > > > > > > natural sequence, but that is all.
> > > > > > > > Without an A series, there is nothing to justify the idea that only one
> > > > > > > > time capsule is conscious "at a time". Either they all are, or none
> > > > > > > > are. We know we are conscious, so we must reject the "none are" option.
> > > > > > > > The Block Universe therefore predicts that all time capsules are
> > > > > > > > conscious. This is in line with the way the Block Universe spatialises
> > > > > > > > Time. It predicts that consciousness is a single 4-dimensional entity.
> > > > > > > > I would not just be conscious now with memories of the past, I would
> > > > > > > > have a consciousness in the past overlaid on my present consciousness.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > Whether the Block Universe model is right or not, the series of clones you
> > > > > > > describe, set up as an experiment, would still give the experience of being
> > > > > > > continuously conscious through time.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > The problem is not that there would be gaps, the problem
> > > > > > is that they would all be conscious simultaneously.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > > I remember being conscious a second
> > > > > > > ago but how could I possibly know that I didn't just pop into existence
> > > > > > > complete with false memories half a second ago?
> > > > > >
> > > > > > That isn't the problem. The problem is that if time is just like
> > > > > > space, as the BU theory states, you should have single consciousness
> > > > > > spread across time, not a temporal sequence of one-at-a-time
> > > > > > conscious states.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > > All I know is what I am
> > > > > > > experiencing *now*.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Yes. That is the phenomenological fact that contradicts the BU.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > > It is only because I have memories and a sense of being
> > > > > > > the same person over time that I consider it was "I" who woke up this morning
> > > > > > > and it will be "I" again who goes to bed tonight. I don't have a direct telepathic
> > > > > > > link to past or future selves, or copies in the next room, to ensure that they are
> > > > > > > "really me". All I have to go on are my present memories and beliefs, which could
> > > > > > > in theory be artificially implanted without changing anything about my stream of
> > > > > > > consciousness. Nothing is changed if we say that we live only transiently, and the
> > > > > > > feeling that we persist as individuals through time is an illusion.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > > > Stathis Papaioannou
> > > > > > > _________________________________________________________________
> > > > > > > Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail.
> > > > > > > http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d
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Received on Thu Oct 26 2006 - 10:19:11 PDT