Peter Jones writes:
> > > Bruno's versions of COMP must embed Platonism (passim)
> >
> >
> > You keep saying that, and I keep telling you that I need only
> > Arithmetical Realism, which is defined by the belief that classical
> > logic is sound for arithmetic.
>
> You need a UD -- a UD which exists. Somehow, somewhere.
If I could interrupt, the core of the disagreement is what Bruno calls
step 8 of the UDA, invoking his movie graph and Maudlin's Olympia
argument. Bruno's interpretation is that consciousness does not
supevene on actual physical activity, and thereby the naked computations
are freed to weave a virtual world without need of any computer on which
to run. But there are other possible explanations: computationalism may
be false; the accessory non-functional apparatus for handling the
counterfactuals (for example, non-firing neurons in the brain) may make
an instantaneous difference to conscious experience, or may make a
difference by virtue of the fact that it is active in other multiverse branches;
the counterfactuals may not be neccesary for consciousness and a recording
may hence be conscious; some sort of primary matter in any configuration
may be necessary to anchor the computations in the real world. You have
to decide which of these explanations is the least incredible, and I don't think
the "correct" answer really leaps out at you.
Stathis Papaioannou
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Received on Mon Oct 23 2006 - 21:49:45 PDT