Bruno Marchal wrote:
> I answer you, but it is at the same time a test, because most of my
> yesterday (sunday 22 october) posts seems not having been send
> successfully.
> (Some arrived at the archive, but not in my mail box, others nowhere, I
> will wait a whole and resend them: it was message for Peter and David).
Bruno, I think it's the Beta version that's intermittently losing posts
- Colin lost one, and I've lost two. I've posted a topic to this effect
for the list. You may wish to revert to the old version.
David
> Hi Stathis,
>
> I answer you, but it is at the same time a test, because most of my
> yesterday (sunday 22 october) posts seems not having been send
> successfully.
> (Some arrived at the archive, but not in my mail box, others nowhere, I
> will wait a whole and resend them: it was message for Peter and David).
>
> Le 23-oct.-06, à 04:35, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
>
>
>
>
> >> Church thesis just assert that a universal turing machine can compute
> >> all computable functions from N to N.
> >> It relate a mathematical object with a human cognitive notion. It does
> >> not invoke physical machine at all.
> >
> > In a sense that is true, but a TM is still a model of what could
> > possibly be built
> > in a physical universe such as ours. Of course the model is still
> > valid irrespective
> > of the existence of a physical machine or indeed a physical universe,
> > but if you
> > abandon the idea of a physical universe there is no need to constrain
> > yourself to
> > models based on one.
>
> I am not sure why you say the TM model is based on what we can build in
> the physical universe.
> Both with comp and without, the physical universe is a priori far
> richer than a UTM.
> The UTM of Turing relies explicitly on an analysis of human capacity
> for computations.
> Post universal systems are based on analysis of mathematician
> psychology.
>
>
>
> > So I suppose the two questions I have (which you partly
> > answer below) are, having arrived at step 8 of the UDA could you go
> > back and
> > say that the UD is not really necessary but all the required
> > computations exist
> > eternally without any generating mechanism or program (after all, you
> > make this
> > assumption for the UD itself), or alternatively, could you have
> > started with step
> > 8 and eliminate the need for the UD in the argument at all?
>
>
> This is the way I proceed in "Conscience and Mechanism". I begin, by
> using the movie graph argument MGA, to show that consciousness cannot
> be attached to physical activities, and then I use the UD to explain
> that the comp-physics get the form of a measure on all computations.
> In my Lille thesis I do the opposite because the UDA is simpler than
> the MGA. It is not so important.
> UD is needed to justify and to make mathematically precise the ontic
> 3-observer moments. They correspond to its (the UD) accessible states.
>
>
>
> >
> >>> It seems that this is the computer you
> >>> have in mind to run the UD.
> >>
> >> Only for providing a decor for a story. This assumption is eliminated
> >> when we arrive (step eight of UDA-8) at the conclusion that universal
> >> digital machine cannot distinguish any "reality" from an arithmetical
> >> one.
> >>
> >>
> >>> That's OK and the argument works (assuming
> >>> comp etc.), but in Platonia you have access to hypercomputers of the
> >>> best
> >>> and fastest kind.
> >>
> >> Fastness is relative in Platonia. Universal machine can always been
> >> sped up on almost all their inputs (There is a theorem by Blum and
> >> Marquez to that effect). Then indeed there are the "angels" and
> >> hierachies of "non-comp" machine. A vast category of "angels" can be
> >> shown to have the same hypostases (so we cannot tested by empirical
> >> means if we are such angels). Then they are entities very closed to
> >> the
> >> "one", having stronger hypostases, i.e. you need to add axioms to G
> >> and
> >> G* (or V, V* with explicit comp) to get them.
> >
> > Of course I was joking when I said "best and fastest". In Platonia
> > there is
> > no actual time and everything is as fast and as perfect as you want it.
>
> OK. But of course there exist notion of relative time: a fast Fourier
> transform is faster than a slow Fourier transform, even in Platonia. Of
> course this can be said in term of number of steps in computations (no
> need to invoke time).
>
> Bruno
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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Received on Mon Oct 23 2006 - 12:53:05 PDT